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Plea bargaining and investigation effort: inquisitorial criminal procedure as a three-player game

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  • Robin Christmann

    (University of Applied Sciences)

Abstract

This paper contributes to the question whether plea bargaining is compatible with the inquisitorial tradition. We stylize inquisitorial criminal procedure as a sequential game with two impartial investigators, judge and prosecutor. Both agents are subject to private investigation costs and seek a correct decision over a defendant of uncertain guilt. Our analysis shows that the introduction of plea deals in courtroom helps to overcome the problem of effort coordination between the two agents. Moreover, we demonstrate that the introduction of plea deals reduces the number of wrongful convictions, but this comes at the cost of some guilty defendants getting away unpunished. Our results are robust to small decision errors by the players and attorney moral hazard. We further consider the implications of imperfect verification skills by judges, different timing of deals, or prosecutors who just seek to maximize convictions and guilty pleas.

Suggested Citation

  • Robin Christmann, 2023. "Plea bargaining and investigation effort: inquisitorial criminal procedure as a three-player game," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 56(3), pages 497-532, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:56:y:2023:i:3:d:10.1007_s10657-023-09782-9
    DOI: 10.1007/s10657-023-09782-9
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    4. Robin Christmann, 2021. "Prosecution and Conviction under Hindsight-Biased Information Updating in Adversary Legal Systems," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 177(4), pages 404-427.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Screening; Free-riding; Litigation; Court errors;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K14 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Criminal Law
    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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