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Does ESG contracting align or compete with stakeholder interests?

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  • Gaia Soana, Maria

Abstract

The paper investigates whether ESG-linked managerial incentives, also known as ESG contracting, align or compete with stakeholder interests in the banking sector. The few related literature, focussed on non-financial companies, shows arguments both pro and against pay for sustainability. Using a panel data set of 595 worldwide listed banks for the period 2010–2021, the paper studies the effectiveness of ESG incentives in improving ESG performance and limiting ESG controversies. ESG contracting is shown to improve both ESG performance and ESG disputes, thus suggesting that it is more symbolic than substantial in meeting stakeholder interests. ESG strategy, ESG committee and managerial risk-taking are significant channels through which ESG incentives affect ESG performance and ESG controversies in the banking sector.

Suggested Citation

  • Gaia Soana, Maria, 2024. "Does ESG contracting align or compete with stakeholder interests?," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 96(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:intfin:v:96:y:2024:i:c:s1042443124001240
    DOI: 10.1016/j.intfin.2024.102058
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    ESG-linked incentives; Bank stakeholders; ESG performance; ESG controversies;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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