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Price cap regulation and information acquisition

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  • Iossa, Elisabetta
  • Stroffolini, Francesca

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  • Iossa, Elisabetta & Stroffolini, Francesca, 2002. "Price cap regulation and information acquisition," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(7), pages 1013-1036, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:indorg:v:20:y:2002:i:7:p:1013-1036
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Cremer, Jacques & Khalil, Fahad & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 1998. "Strategic Information Gathering before a Contract Is Offered," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 163-200, July.
    2. Baron, David P & Myerson, Roger B, 1982. "Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 911-930, July.
    3. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1986. "Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(3), pages 614-641, June.
    4. Cremer, Jacques & Khalil, Fahad & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 1998. "Contracts and Productive Information Gathering," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 174-193, November.
    5. Tracy R. Lewis & David E.M. Sappington, 1989. "Regulatory Options and Price-Cap Regulation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(3), pages 405-416, Autumn.
    6. Gasmi, F & Ivaldi, M & Laffont, Jean Jacques, 1994. "Rent Extraction and Incentives for Efficiency in Recent Regulatory Proposals," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 151-176, May.
    7. Lewis, Tracy R & Sappington, David E M, 1997. "Information Management in Incentive Problems," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(4), pages 796-821, August.
    8. Tracy R. Lewis & David E.M. Sappington, 1988. "Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Demand and Cost Functions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(3), pages 438-457, Autumn.
    9. M.E. Beesley & S.C. Littlechild, 1989. "The Regulation of Privatized Monopolies in the United Kingdom," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(3), pages 454-472, Autumn.
    10. Colin Mayer & John Vickers, 1996. "Profit-sharing regulation: an economic appraisal," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 17(1), pages 1-18, February.
    11. Lewis, Tracy R & Sappington, David E M, 1988. "Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Demand," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(5), pages 986-998, December.
    12. Sobel, Joel, 1993. "Information Control in the Principal-Agent Problem," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 34(2), pages 259-269, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Filippini, M. & Greene, W. & Masiero, G., 2018. "Persistent and transient productive inefficiency in a regulated industry: electricity distribution," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 325-334.
    2. Elisabetta Iossa & Francesca Stroffolini, 2007. "Integration and Separation with Costly Demand Information," CSEF Working Papers 170, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    3. De Borger, Bruno & Fosgerau, Mogens, 2012. "Information provision by regulated public transport companies," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 46(4), pages 492-510.
    4. Elisabetta Iossa, 2015. "Contract and procurement design for PPPs in highways: the road ahead," Economia e Politica Industriale: Journal of Industrial and Business Economics, Springer;Associazione Amici di Economia e Politica Industriale, vol. 42(3), pages 245-276, September.
    5. Bing Ye & Sanxi Li, 2018. "Competitive contracts with productive information gathering," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 124(1), pages 1-17, May.
    6. Jamison, Mark & Mandy, David M. & Sappington, David E.M., 2014. "Motivating regulated suppliers to assess alternative technologies, protocols, and capital structures," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 13-22.
    7. Kirkpatrick, Colin & Parker, David & Zhang, Yin-Fang, 2004. "Price and Profit Regulation in Developing and Transition Economies, Methods Used and Problems Faced: A Survey of the Regulators," Centre on Regulation and Competition (CRC) Working papers 30596, University of Manchester, Institute for Development Policy and Management (IDPM).
    8. Elisabetta Iossa & Francesca Stroffolini, 2012. "Vertical Integration and Costly Demand Information in Regulated Network Industries," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 40(4), pages 249-271, June.
    9. Stroffolini, Francesca, 2012. "Access profit-sharing regulation with information acquisition and transmission," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 161-174.
    10. Francesca Stroffolini, 2008. "Access Price Cap Mechanisms and Industry Structure with Information Acquisition," CSEF Working Papers 193, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    11. Armstrong, Mark & Sappington, David E.M., 2007. "Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: Mark Armstrong & Robert Porter (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 27, pages 1557-1700, Elsevier.
    12. Iossa, Elisabetta & Stroffolini, Francesca, 2005. "Price cap regulation, revenue sharing and information acquisition," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 217-230, March.

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