Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Demand and Cost Functions
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- Lewis, Tracy R. & Sappington, David E.M., 1987. "Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Demand and Cost Functions," Working Papers 225924, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
References listed on IDEAS
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Citations
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Cited by:
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"Verifiable and non-verifiable anonymous mechanisms for regulating a polluting monopolist,"
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- James E. Prieger & Nicholas J. Sanders, 2011. "Verifiable and Non-Verifiable Anonymous Mechanisms for Regulating a Polluting Monopolist," Discussion Papers 10-034, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
- Jehiel, Philippe & Moldovanu, Benny & Stacchetti, Ennio, 1999.
"Multidimensional Mechanism Design for Auctions with Externalities,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 85(2), pages 258-293, April.
- Jehiel, Phillipe & Moldovanu, Benny & Stacchetti, E., 1997. "Multidimensional Mechanism Design for Auctions with Externalities," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 97-04, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
- Moldovanu, Benny & Jehiel, Philippe & Stacchetti, Ennio, 1997. "Multidimensional Mechanism Design for Auctions with Externalities," Papers 97-04, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
- Robert Gary‐Bobo & Yossi Spiegel, 2006.
"Optimal state‐contingent regulation under limited liability,"
RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 37(2), pages 431-448, June.
- Gary-Bobo, Robert J. & Spiegel, Yossi, 2003. "Optimal State-Contingent Regulation under Limited Liability," CEPR Discussion Papers 3920, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- R. Gary-Bobo & Y. Spiegel, 2003. "Optimal state-contingent regulation under limited liability," THEMA Working Papers 2003-09, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- Aguirre, Iñaki & Beitia, Arantza, 2017. "Modelling countervailing incentives in adverse selection models: A synthesis," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 82-89.
- Hahn, Robert & Evans, Lewis, 2010. "Regulating Dynamic Markets: Progress in Theory and Practice," Working Paper Series 4052, Victoria University of Wellington, The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation.
- Blackorby, Charles & Szalay, Dezso, 2008.
"Regulating a Monopolist with unknown costs and unknown quality capacity,"
Economic Research Papers
269856, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
- Blackorby, Charles & Szalay, Dezsö, 2008. "Regulating a Monopolist with unknown costs and unknown quality capacity," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 858, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Armstrong, Mark, 1999. "Optimal Regulation with Unknown Demand and Cost Functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 196-215, February.
- Sappington, David E.M., 2024. "Optimal revenue adjustment in the presence of exogenous demand variation," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 131(C).
- van Egteren, Henry, 1996. "Regulating an externality-generating public utility: A multi-dimensional screening approach," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(9), pages 1773-1797, December.
- Barelli, Paulo & Basov, Suren & Bugarin, Mauricio & King, Ian, 2014. "On the optimality of exclusion in multi-dimensional screening," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 74-83.
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- Sand, Jan Y., 2012. "Infrastructure quality regulation," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 310-319.
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- Iossa, Elisabetta & Stroffolini, Francesca, 2002. "Price cap regulation and information acquisition," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(7), pages 1013-1036, September.
- Wang, Jiao & Liu, Zhibing & Zhao, Ruiqing, 2019. "On the interaction between asymmetric demand signal and forecast accuracy information," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 277(3), pages 857-874.
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