A Principal-Agent Model of Sequential Testing
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- , & ,, 2012. "A principal-agent model of sequential testing," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(3), September.
- Dino Gerardi & Lucas Maestri, 2009. "A Principal-Agent Model of Sequential Testing," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000076, David K. Levine.
- Dino Gerardi & Lucas Maestri, 2009. "A Principal-Agent Model of Sequential Testing," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 115, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
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- Johannes Horner & Larry Samuelson, 2009. "Incentives for Experimenting Agents," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1726R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Feb 2012.
- Johannes Horner & Larry Samuelson, 2009. "Incentives for Experimenting Agents," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1726, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Johannes Horner & Larry Samuelson, 2012. "Incentives for Experimenting Agents," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000418, David K. Levine.
- Johannes Horner & Larry Samuelson, 2013. "Incentives for Experimenting Agents," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000671, David K. Levine.
- Johannes Horner & Larry Samuelson, 2009. "Incentives for Experimenting Agents," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1726R2, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Mar 2013.
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- Rodivilov, Alexander, 2022. "Monitoring innovation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 135(C), pages 297-326.
- Chen, Chia-Hui & Ishida, Junichiro, 2018.
"Hierarchical experimentation,"
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- Chia-Hui Chen & Junichiro Ishida, 2015. "Hierarchical Experimentation," ISER Discussion Paper 0949, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Nicolas Klein & Tymofiy Mylovanov, 2011. "Should the Flatterers be Avoided?," 2011 Meeting Papers 1273, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Gomes, Renato & Gottlieb, Daniel & Maestri, Lucas, 2016.
"Experimentation and project selection: Screening and learning,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 145-169.
- Gomes, Renato & Gottlieb, Daniel & Maestri, Lucas, 2016. "Experimentation and project selection: screening and learning," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 102229, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Carroll, Gabriel, 2019. "Robust incentives for information acquisition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 181(C), pages 382-420.
- Chia‐Hui Chen & Junichiro Ishida, 2018.
"Dynamic performance evaluation with deadlines: The role of commitment,"
Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(2), pages 377-422, June.
- Chia-Hui Chen & Junichiro Ishida, 2017. "Dynamic Performance Evaluation with Deadlines: The Role of Commitment," ISER Discussion Paper 1015, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka.
- Khalil, Fahad & Lawarree, Jacques & Rodivilov, Alexander, 2020.
"Learning from failures: Optimal contracts for experimentation and production,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 190(C).
- Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarree & Alexander Rodivilov, 2018. "Learning from Failures: Optimal Contract for Experimentation and Production," CESifo Working Paper Series 7310, CESifo.
- Achim, Peter, 2024. "Innovation through competitive experimentation," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 111(C).
- Gao, Hong & Xu, Haibo, 2020. "Learning, belief manipulation and optimal relationship termination," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 190(C).
- Chia-Hui Chen & Junichiro Ishida, 2015. "A Tenure-Clock Problem," ISER Discussion Paper 0919, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka.
- Samuel Häfner & Curtis R. Taylor, 2022. "On young Turks and yes men: optimal contracting for advice," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 53(1), pages 63-94, March.
- Alessandro Spiganti, 2020. "Can Starving Start‐ups Beat Fat Labs? A Bandit Model of Innovation with Endogenous Financing Constraint," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 122(2), pages 702-731, April.
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More about this item
Keywords
Dynamic mechanism design; Information acquisition; Sequential testing;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CTA-2008-11-11 (Contract Theory and Applications)
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