Too many goals: Problems with the 700Â MHz auction
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Jeremy Bulow & Jonathan Levin & Paul Milgrom, 2009.
"Winning Play in Spectrum Auctions,"
NBER Working Papers
14765, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Jeremy Bulow & Jonathan Levin & Paul Milgrom, 2009. "Winning Play in Spectrum Auctions," Discussion Papers 08-023, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Anker, Peter, 2017. "From spectrum management to spectrum governance," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 41(5), pages 486-497.
- Bazelon, Coleman & McHenry, Giulia, 2013. "Spectrum value," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 37(9), pages 737-747.
- Gary Madden & Hiroaki Suenaga, 2017. "The determinants of price in 3G spectrum auctions," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 49(32), pages 3129-3140, July.
- Saint, Martin & Brown, Timothy X, 2019. "A dynamic policy license for flexible spectrum management," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 23-37.
- Peter Cramton & Evan Kwerel & Gregory Rosston & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2011.
"Using Spectrum Auctions to Enhance Competition in Wireless Services,"
Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 54(S4), pages 167-188.
- Peter Cramton & Evan Kwerel & Gregory Rosston & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2011. "Using Spectrum Auctions to Enhance Competition in Wireless Services," Discussion Papers 10-015, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
- Peter Cramton & Evan Kwerel & Gregory Rosston & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2012. "Using Spectrum Auctions to Enhance Competition in Wireless Services," Papers of Peter Cramton 11ckrs, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2012.
- Thomas W. Hazlett & David Porter & Vernon Smith, 2011.
"Radio Spectrum and the Disruptive Clarity of Ronald Coase,"
Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 54(S4), pages 125-165.
- Thomas W. Hazlett & David Porter & Vernon L. Smith, 2009. "Radio Spectrum and the Disruptive Clarity OF Ronald Coase," Working Papers 09-11, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
- Gary Madden & Erik Bohlin & Paitoon Kraipornsak & Thien Tran, 2014. "The determinants of prices in the FCC's 700 MHz spectrum auction," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 46(17), pages 1953-1960, June.
- Gregory Rosston, 2014. "Increasing the Efficiency of Spectrum Allocation," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 45(3), pages 221-243, November.
- Thomas W. Hazlett & Joshua D. Wright, 2017. "The Effect of Regulation on Broadband Markets: Evaluating the Empirical Evidence in the FCC’s 2015 “Open Internet” Order," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 50(4), pages 487-507, June.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Le, Phuong, 2018. "Pareto optimal budgeted combinatorial auctions," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(2), May.
- Mo Xiao & Zhe Yuan, 2022.
"License Complementarity and Package Bidding: US Spectrum Auctions,"
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 14(4), pages 420-464, November.
- Mo Xiao & Zhe Yuan, 2018. "License Complementarity and Package Bidding: The U.S. Spectrum Auctions," Working Papers 18-06, NET Institute.
- Phuong Le, 2017. "Mechanisms for combinatorial auctions with budget constraints," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 21(1), pages 1-31, March.
- Burkett, Justin, 2016. "Optimally constraining a bidder using a simple budget," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(1), January.
- Ghosh, Gagan & Liu, Heng, 2019. "Sequential second-price auctions with private budgets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 611-632.
- Thomas W. Hazlett & David Porter & Vernon Smith, 2011.
"Radio Spectrum and the Disruptive Clarity of Ronald Coase,"
Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 54(S4), pages 125-165.
- Thomas W. Hazlett & David Porter & Vernon L. Smith, 2009. "Radio Spectrum and the Disruptive Clarity OF Ronald Coase," Working Papers 09-11, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
- Burkett, Justin, 2015. "Endogenous budget constraints in auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PA), pages 1-20.
- Le, Phuong, 2015. "Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions with Budget Constraints," MPRA Paper 66292, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Peter Cramton, 2013.
"Spectrum Auction Design,"
Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 42(2), pages 161-190, March.
- Peter Cramton, 2009. "Spectrum Auction Design," Papers of Peter Cramton 09sad, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2012.
- Kazumori, Eiichiro & Belch, Yaakov, 2019. "t-Tree: The Tokyo toolbox for large-scale combinatorial auction experiments," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, Elsevier, vol. 24(C).
- Lawrence M. Ausubel & Justin E. Burkett & Emel Filiz-Ozbay, 2017. "An experiment on auctions with endogenous budget constraints," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 20(4), pages 973-1006, December.
- Gary Madden & Erik Bohlin & Paitoon Kraipornsak & Thien Tran, 2014. "The determinants of prices in the FCC's 700 MHz spectrum auction," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 46(17), pages 1953-1960, June.
- Jonathan Levin & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2014.
"Are Dynamic Vickrey Auctions Practical?: Properties of the Combinatorial Clock Auction,"
NBER Working Papers
20487, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Jonathan Levin & Andrzej (Andy) Skrzypacz, 2014. "Are Dynamic Vickrey Auctions Practical?: Properties of the Combinatorial Clock Auction," Discussion Papers 14-002, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
- Le, Phuong, 2014. "Modified VCG Mechanisms in Combinatorial Auctions with Budget Constraints," MPRA Paper 66384, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Jianfu Shen & Frederik Pretorius & K. W. Chau, 2018. "Land Auctions with Budget Constraints," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 56(3), pages 443-471, April.
- Mölleryd, Bengt G. & Markendahl, Jan, 2012. "The value of spectrum and the impact of the breakthrough for mobile data: The case of India, Sweden and Thailand," 19th ITS Biennial Conference, Bangkok 2012: Moving Forward with Future Technologies - Opening a Platform for All 72479, International Telecommunications Society (ITS).
- Boulatov, Alexei & Severinov, Sergei, 2021. "Optimal and efficient mechanisms with asymmetrically budget constrained buyers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 155-178.
- Matoso, Rafael & Rezende, Marcelo, 2014. "Asymmetric information in oil and gas lease auctions with a national company," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 72-82.
- Sridhar, V. & Prasad, Rohit, 2021. "Analysis of spectrum pricing for commercial mobile services: A cross country study," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 45(9).
- Mölleryd, Bengt G. & Markendahl, Jan, 2014. "Analysis of spectrum auctions in India—An application of the opportunity cost approach to explain large variations in spectrum prices," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 236-247.
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:iepoli:v:21:y:2009:i:2:p:115-127. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505549 .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.