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Impact of a diagnosis-related group payment system on cesarean section in Korea

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  • Kim, Seung Ju
  • Han, Kyu-Tae
  • Kim, Sun Jung
  • Park, Eun-Cheol
  • Park, Hye Ki

Abstract

Cesarean sections (CSs) are the most expensive method of delivery, which may affect the physician's choice of treatment when providing health services to patients. We investigated the effects of the diagnosis-related group (DRG)-based payment system on CSs in Korea. We used National Health Insurance claim data from 2011 to 2014, which included 1,289,989 delivery cases at 674 hospitals. We used a generalized estimating equation model to evaluate the association between the likelihood of cesarean delivery and the length of the DRG adoption period. A total of 477,309 (37.0%) delivery cases were performed by CSs. We found that a longer DRG adoption period was associated with a lower odds ratio of CSs (odds ratio [OR]: 0.997, 95% CI: 0.996–0.998). In addition, a longer DRG adoption period was associated with a lower odds ratio for CSs in hospitals that had voluntarily adopted the DRG system. Similar results were also observed for urban hospitals, primiparas, and those under 28 years old and over 33 years old. Our results suggest that the change in the reimbursement system was associated with a low likelihood of CSs. The impact of DRG adoption on cesarean delivery can also be expected to increase with time, as our finding provides evidence that the reimbursement system is associated with the health provider's decision to provide health services for patients.

Suggested Citation

  • Kim, Seung Ju & Han, Kyu-Tae & Kim, Sun Jung & Park, Eun-Cheol & Park, Hye Ki, 2016. "Impact of a diagnosis-related group payment system on cesarean section in Korea," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 120(6), pages 596-603.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:hepoli:v:120:y:2016:i:6:p:596-603
    DOI: 10.1016/j.healthpol.2016.04.018
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    3. Chien, Ling-Chen & Chou, Yiing-Jenq & Huang, Yu-Chin & Shen, Yi-Jung & Huang, Nicole, 2020. "Reducing low value services in surgical inpatients in Taiwan: Does diagnosis-related group payment work?," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 124(1), pages 89-96.

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