Impact of Diagnosis Related Group Refinement on the Choice Between Scheduled Caesarean Section and Normal Delivery: Recent Evidence from France
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- Aleksandr Proshin & Alexandre Cazenave-Lacroutz & Zeynep Or & Lise Rochaix, 2018. "Impact of Diagnosis Related Group Refinement on the Choice Between Scheduled Caesarean Section and Normal Delivery: Recent Evidence from France," PSE Working Papers halshs-01812107, HAL.
References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywords
C-section; DRG; midwifes; obstetricians; refinement; tariffs; vaginal labor;All these keywords.
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-EUR-2018-07-23 (Microeconomic European Issues)
- NEP-HEA-2018-07-23 (Health Economics)
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