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Bundle and separate sales in auctions with entry

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  • Chakraborty, Indranil

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  • Chakraborty, Indranil, 2006. "Bundle and separate sales in auctions with entry," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 31-46, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:54:y:2006:i:1:p:31-46
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Palfrey, Thomas R, 1983. "Bundling Decisions by a Multiproduct Monopolist with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(2), pages 463-483, March.
    2. Indranil Chakraborty, 2002. "Bundling and the Reduction of the Winner's Curse," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 11(4), pages 663-684, December.
    3. Indranil Chakraborty, 1999. "Bundling decisions for selling multiple objects," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 13(3), pages 723-733.
    4. Jehiel, Philippe & Meyer-ter-Vehn, Moritz & Moldovanu, Benny, 2007. "Mixed bundling auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 494-512, May.
    5. McAfee, R. Preston & McMillan, John, 1987. "Auctions with entry," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 343-347.
    6. Mark Armstrong, 2000. "Optimal Multi-Object Auctions," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 67(3), pages 455-481.
    7. R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan & Michael D. Whinston, 1989. "Multiproduct Monopoly, Commodity Bundling, and Correlation of Values," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 104(2), pages 371-383.
    8. Christopher Avery & Terrence Hendershott, 2000. "Bundling and Optimal Auctions of Multiple Products," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 67(3), pages 483-497.
    9. Levin, Dan & Smith, James L, 1994. "Equilibrium in Auctions with Entry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 585-599, June.
    10. Harstad, Ronald M, 1990. "Alternative Common-Value Auction Procedures: Revenue Comparisons with Free Entry," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(2), pages 421-429, April.
    11. Eiichiro Kazumori & John McMillan, 2003. "Selliing Online Versus Offline," Levine's Working Paper Archive 506439000000000254, David K. Levine.
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    Cited by:

    1. Chow, YuenLeng & Yavas, Abdullah, 2008. "Auctions with Positive Synergies: Experimental Evidence," MPRA Paper 12669, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Raphaële Préget & Sophie Thoyer, 2009. "Multi-Unit Auctions and Competition Stricture," Working Papers 09-18, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Dec 2009.
    3. Tharun Dolla & Boeing Laishram, 2019. "Bundling in public–private partnership projects – a conceptual framework," International Journal of Productivity and Performance Management, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 69(6), pages 1177-1203, December.
    4. Chen, Yanbin & Li, Sanxi & Yu, Jun, 2018. "Bundling decisions in multi-objects auctions with optimal reserve prices," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 141-145.
    5. Estache, Antonio & Iimi, Atsushi, 2011. "(Un)bundling infrastructure procurement: Evidence from water supply and sewage projects," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 104-114, June.
    6. Yeu-Shiang Huang & Min-Sheng Yang & Jyh-Wen Ho, 2022. "Bundling Decisions for Selling Multiple Items in Online Auctions," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 19(1), pages 44-62, March.

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