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Anonymous Games with Binary Actions

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  • Blonski, Matthias

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  • Blonski, Matthias, 1999. "Anonymous Games with Binary Actions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 171-180, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:28:y:1999:i:2:p:171-180
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J & Rob, Rafael, 1993. "Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 29-56, January.
    2. Arthur, W Brian, 1989. "Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by Historical Events," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 99(394), pages 116-131, March.
    3. Rath, Kali P, 1992. "A Direct Proof of the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games with a Continuum of Players," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 2(3), pages 427-433, July.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Deepanshu Vasal & Randall Berry, 2020. "Fault Tolerant Equilibria in Anonymous Games: best response correspondences and fixed points," Papers 2005.06812, arXiv.org, revised May 2022.
    2. Kets, W., 2007. "The Minority Game : An Economics Perspective," Other publications TiSEM 65d52a6a-b27d-45a9-93a7-e, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    3. Dai Zusai, 2018. "Evolutionary dynamics in heterogeneous populations: a general framework for an arbitrary type distribution," Papers 1805.04897, arXiv.org, revised May 2019.
    4. Kets, W. & Voorneveld, M., 2007. "Congestion, Equilibrium and Learning : The Minority Game," Discussion Paper 2007-61, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    5. Kets, W., 2008. "Networks and learning in game theory," Other publications TiSEM 7713fce1-3131-498c-8c6f-3, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    6. Eliaz, Kfir & Spiegler, Ran, 2015. "X-games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 93-100.
    7. Arato, Hiroki & Hori, Takeo & Nakamura, Tomoya, 2021. "Endogenous information acquisition and the partial announcement policy," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 55(C).
    8. Blonski, Matthias, 2005. "The women of Cairo: Equilibria in large anonymous games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 253-264, April.
    9. Haoning Chen & Miaomiao Dong & Marc Henry & Ivan Sidorov, 2020. "Occupational segregation in a Roy model with composition preferences," Papers 2012.04485, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2024.
    10. Roughgarden, Tim & Tardos, Eva, 2004. "Bounding the inefficiency of equilibria in nonatomic congestion games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 389-403, May.
    11. Blonski, Matthias, 2000. "Characterization of pure strategy equilibria in finite anonymous games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 225-233, October.
    12. Blonski, Matthias, 2002. "Network externalities and two-part tariffs in telecommunication markets," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 95-109, March.
    13. Pin, Paolo & Rogers, Brian W., 2015. "Cooperation, punishment and immigration," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 72-101.
    14. Dai Zusai, 2017. "Nonaggregable evolutionary dynamics under payoff heterogeneity," DETU Working Papers 1702, Department of Economics, Temple University.
    15. Papadimitriou, Christos, 2015. "The Complexity of Computing Equilibria," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    16. Babichenko, Yakov, 2013. "Best-reply dynamics in large binary-choice anonymous games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 130-144.
    17. Paulwin Graewe & Ulrich Horst & Ronnie Sircar, 2021. "A Maximum Principle approach to deterministic Mean Field Games of Control with Absorption," Papers 2104.06152, arXiv.org.
    18. Daskalakis, Constantinos & Papadimitriou, Christos H., 2015. "Approximate Nash equilibria in anonymous games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 207-245.
    19. Argyrios Deligkas & Eduard Eiben & Gregory Gutin & Philip R. Neary & Anders Yeo, 2023. "Some coordination problems are harder than others," Papers 2311.03195, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2023.

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