IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/gamebe/v89y2015icp93-100.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

X-games

Author

Listed:
  • Eliaz, Kfir
  • Spiegler, Ran

Abstract

What is common to the following situations: designing random incentive schemes to implement team effort, monopoly pricing when consumers are loss averse, arms races when players are privately informed of their armament costs? We present a simple formalism, called X-games, which captures these situations as well as others, and use it to unify and extend the separate analyses that they received in the literature.

Suggested Citation

  • Eliaz, Kfir & Spiegler, Ran, 2015. "X-games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 93-100.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:89:y:2015:i:c:p:93-100
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.12.005
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825614001717
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.geb.2014.12.005?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Eyal Winter, 2004. "Incentives and Discrimination," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(3), pages 764-773, June.
    2. Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, 1985. "Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(1), pages 70-83, Spring.
    3. Botond Kőszegi, 2010. "Utility from anticipation and personal equilibrium," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 44(3), pages 415-444, September.
    4. Botond Kőszegi & Matthew Rabin, 2006. "A Model of Reference-Dependent Preferences," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 121(4), pages 1133-1165.
    5. József Sákovics & Jakub Steiner, 2012. "Who Matters in Coordination Problems?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(7), pages 3439-3461, December.
    6. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1989. "The Electronic Mail Game: Strategic Behavior under "Almost Common Knowledge."," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(3), pages 385-391, June.
    7. Sandeep Baliga & Tomas Sjöström, 2004. "Arms Races and Negotiations," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 71(2), pages 351-369.
    8. , & ,, 2014. "Regular prices and sales," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(1), January.
    9. Spiegler, Ran, 2000. "Extracting Interaction-Created Surplus," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 142-162, January.
    10. Blonski, Matthias, 2000. "Characterization of pure strategy equilibria in finite anonymous games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 225-233, October.
    11. Blonski, Matthias, 1999. "Anonymous Games with Binary Actions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 171-180, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Raphaël Soubeyran, 2019. "Technology adoption and pro-social preferences," Working Papers halshs-02291905, HAL.
    2. Raphaël Soubeyran, 2019. "Incentives, pro-social preferences and discrimination," Working Papers hal-02056347, HAL.
    3. Argyrios Deligkas & Eduard Eiben & Gregory Gutin & Philip R. Neary & Anders Yeo, 2023. "Some coordination problems are harder than others," Papers 2311.03195, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2023.
    4. Freeman, David J., 2017. "Preferred personal equilibrium and simple choices," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 165-172.
    5. Christina Aperjis & Filippo Balestrieri, 2017. "Loss aversion leading to advantageous selection," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 55(2), pages 203-227, December.
    6. Ghosal, Sayantan & Dalton, Patricio, 2013. "Characterizing Behavioral Decisions with Choice Data," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 107, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
    7. Gentry, Matthew & Pesendorfer, Martin, 2021. "Pricing with bargain hunting consumers," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 111591, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    8. Jong-Hee Hahn & Jinwoo Kim & Sang-Hyun Kim & Jihong Lee, 2018. "Price discrimination with loss averse consumers," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 65(3), pages 681-728, May.
    9. Gesche, Tobias, 2018. "Reference Price Shifts and Customer Antagonism: Evidence from Reviews for Online Auctions," VfS Annual Conference 2018 (Freiburg, Breisgau): Digital Economy 181650, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    10. Lucia Del Carpio & Samuel Kapon & Sylvain Chassang, 2022. "Using Divide-and-Conquer to Improve Tax Collection: Evidence from the Field," Working Papers 301, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies..
    11. Heiko Karle & Heiner Schumacher & Rune Vølund, 2020. "Consumer search and the uncertainty effect," Working Papers of Department of Economics, Leuven 657766, KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB), Department of Economics, Leuven.
    12. Külpmann, Philipp & Khantadze, Davit, 2016. "Identifying the reasons for coordination failure in a laboratory experiment," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 567, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    13. Besters, Lucas, 2018. "Economics of professional football," Other publications TiSEM d9e6b9b7-a17b-4665-9cca-1, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    14. Charness, Gary & Kuhn, Peter, 2011. "Lab Labor: What Can Labor Economists Learn from the Lab?," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 3, pages 229-330, Elsevier.
    15. Xavier Gabaix, 2014. "A Sparsity-Based Model of Bounded Rationality," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 129(4), pages 1661-1710.
    16. Ostrizek, Franz & Sartori, Elia, 2023. "Screening while controlling an externality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 139(C), pages 26-55.
    17. Greg Fischer & Dean Karlan & Margaret McConnell & Pia Raffler, 2014. "To Charge or Not to Charge: Evidence from a Health Products Experiment in Uganda," Working Papers 1041, Economic Growth Center, Yale University.
    18. März, Oliver, 2019. "Competitive persuasive advertising under consumer loss aversion," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 185(C).
    19. Vincent Meisner & Jonas von Wangenheim, 2022. "Loss aversion in strategy-proof school-choice mechanisms," Papers 2207.14666, arXiv.org.
    20. Ahrens, Steffen & Pirschel, Inske & Snower, Dennis J., 2017. "A theory of price adjustment under loss aversion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 78-95.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Externalities; Strategic complements; Strategic substitutes;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:89:y:2015:i:c:p:93-100. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.