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Continuous time vs. backward induction a new approach to modelling reputation in the finite time horizon context

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  • Conlon, John R.

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  • Conlon, John R., 1995. "Continuous time vs. backward induction a new approach to modelling reputation in the finite time horizon context," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 19(8), pages 1449-1469, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:19:y:1995:i:8:p:1449-1469
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lipman, Barton L., 1990. "Delaying or deterring entry A game-theoretic analysis," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 14(3-4), pages 685-708, October.
    2. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2008. "Reputation And Equilibrium Selection In Games With A Patient Player," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 7, pages 123-142, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    3. Simon, Leo K & Stinchcombe, Maxwell B, 1989. "Extensive Form Games in Continuous Time: Pure Strategies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(5), pages 1171-1214, September.
    4. Kreps, David M. & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Reputation and imperfect information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 253-279, August.
    5. Faust, Jon, 1989. "Supernovas in Monetary Theory: Does the Ultimate Sunspot Rule Out Money?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(4), pages 872-881, September.
    6. Bergin, James & MacLeod, W Bentley, 1993. "Continuous Time Repeated Games," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 34(1), pages 21-37, February.
    7. Radner, Roy, 1980. "Collusive behavior in noncooperative epsilon-equilibria of oligopolies with long but finite lives," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 136-154, April.
    8. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1982. "Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 280-312, August.
    9. Dorsey, Robert E, 1992. "The Voluntary Contributions Mechanism with Real Time Revisions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 73(3), pages 261-282, April.
    10. Friedman, James W., 1985. "Cooperative equilibria in finite horizon noncooperative supergames," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 390-398, August.
    11. Benoit, Jean-Pierre & Krishna, Vijay, 1985. "Finitely Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(4), pages 905-922, July.
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