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Performance of foundation-owned firms in Germany: The role of foundation purpose, stock market listing, and family involvement

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  • Block, Jörn
  • Jarchow, Svenja
  • Kammerlander, Nadine
  • Hosseini, Florian
  • Achleitner, Ann-Kristin

Abstract

To address succession issues, the owners of family firms increasingly transfer their equity to family and charitable foundations, thereby creating so-called foundation-owned firms. This form of succession has become increasingly common in various European countries. A small yet insightful stream of research has emerged comparing the performance of foundation-owned firms against the performance of nonfoundation-owned firms. Our study goes one step further and accounts for the heterogeneous nature of foundation-owned firms. We investigate the role of foundation purpose (family versus charitable foundation), stock market listing, and family involvement. Our results show that firms owned by a family foundation have better accounting performance than firms owned by a charitable foundation. We further find a performance-enhancing effect of family involvement in the firm’s management or supervisory board. Contrary to our expectations, we did not observe significant performance differences between private and stock market-listed foundation-owned firms. Our study advances the emergent stream of the foundation-owned (family) firm literature by integrating research on foundation-owned firms with research on family firms. Furthermore, we contribute to the corporate governance literature on ownership effects and blockholder ownership.

Suggested Citation

  • Block, Jörn & Jarchow, Svenja & Kammerlander, Nadine & Hosseini, Florian & Achleitner, Ann-Kristin, 2020. "Performance of foundation-owned firms in Germany: The role of foundation purpose, stock market listing, and family involvement," Journal of Family Business Strategy, Elsevier, vol. 11(4).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:fambus:v:11:y:2020:i:4:s1877858520300838
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jfbs.2020.100356
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