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Religious prohibitions against usury

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  • Reed, Clyde G.
  • Bekar, Cliff T.

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  • Reed, Clyde G. & Bekar, Cliff T., 2003. "Religious prohibitions against usury," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 40(4), pages 347-368, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:exehis:v:40:y:2003:i:4:p:347-368
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    1. de Roover, Raymond, 1958. "The Concept of the Just Price: Theory and Economic Policy," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(4), pages 418-434, December.
    2. Laurence Fontaine, 2001. "Antonio and Shylock: credit and trust in France, c. 1680-c. 1780," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 54(1), pages 39-57, February.
    3. Posner, Eric A, 1995. "Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of the Unconscionablility Doctrine, Usury Laws, and Related Limitations on the Freedom to Contract," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(2), pages 283-319, June.
    4. Fogel, Robert William, 2000. "The Fourth Great Awakening and the Future of Egalitarianism," University of Chicago Press Economics Books, University of Chicago Press, edition 1, number 9780226256627.
    5. Emery, J. C. Herbert, 1996. "Risky Business? Nonactuarial Pricing Practices and the Financial Viability of Fraternal Sickness Insurers," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 195-226, April.
    6. John H. Munro, 2001. "The Origins of the Modern Financial Revolution: Responses to Impediments from Church and State in Western Europe, 1200 - 1600," Working Papers munro-01-02, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    7. Kimball, Miles S, 1988. "Farmers' Cooperatives as Behavior Toward Risk," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(1), pages 224-232, March.
    8. Ekelund, Robert B, Jr & Hebert, Robert F & Tollison, Robert D, 1989. "An Economic Model of the Medieval Church: Usury as a Form of Rent Seeking," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 5(2), pages 307-331, Fall.
    9. Robin Pearson, 1997. "Towards an Historical Model of Services Innovation: The Case of the Insurance Industry, 1700–1914," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 50(2), pages 235-256, May.
    10. Abhijit V. Banerjee & Timothy Besley & Timothy W. Guinnane, 1994. "Thy Neighbor's Keeper: The Design of a Credit Cooperative with Theory and a Test," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 109(2), pages 491-515.
    11. Glaeser, Edward L & Scheinkman, Jose, 1998. "Neither a Borrower nor a Lender Be: An Economic Analysis of Interest Restrictions and Usury Laws," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(1), pages 1-36, April.
    12. Klein, Benjamin & Leffler, Keith B, 1981. "The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 615-641, August.
    13. Greif, Avner, 1994. "Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(5), pages 912-950, October.
    14. Bekar, Cliff T. & Reed, Clyde G., 2003. "Open fields, risk, and land divisibility," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 40(3), pages 308-325, July.
    15. Botticini, Maristella, 2000. "A Tale of “Benevolent” Governments: Private Credit Markets, Public Finance, and the Role of Jewish Lenders in Medieval and Renaissance Italy," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 60(1), pages 164-189, March.
    16. Greif, Avner, 1993. "Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: the Maghribi Traders' Coalition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(3), pages 525-548, June.
    17. Kranton, Rachel E, 1996. "Reciprocal Exchange: A Self-Sustaining System," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(4), pages 830-851, September.
    18. Nielsen, Randall, 1997. "Storage and English Government Intervention in Early Modern Grain Markets," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 57(1), pages 1-33, March.
    19. Steve King, 1997. "Poor Relief and English Economic Development Reappraised," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 50(2), pages 360-368, May.
    20. Dyer,Christopher, 1989. "Standards of Living in the Later Middle Ages," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521272155, November.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Mark Koyama, 2008. "Evading the 'Taint of Usury' Complex Contracts and Segmented Capital Markets," Economics Series Working Papers 412, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    2. Cliff T. Bekar and Clyde Reed, 2009. "Risk, Asset Markets and Inequality: Evidence from Medieval England," Economics Series Working Papers Number 79, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    3. Bekar, Cliff T. & Reed, Clyde G., 2003. "Open fields, risk, and land divisibility," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 40(3), pages 308-325, July.
    4. Zegarra, Luis Felipe, 2017. "Usury laws and private credit in Lima, Peru. Evidence from notarized records," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 68-93.
    5. Zanini, Andrea, 2021. "Pratica degli affari e prescrizioni morali: interesse e sconto nei manuali di aritmetica mercantile (secoli XVI-XVIII) [Business practices and moral precepts: interest and discount in commercial ar," MPRA Paper 108308, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Stefano Adamo & David Alexander & Roberta Fasiello, 2018. "Usury and credit practices in the Middle Ages," CONTABILIT? E CULTURA AZIENDALE, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 2018(1), pages 37-69.
    7. Koyama, Mark, 2010. "Evading the 'Taint of Usury': The usury prohibition as a barrier to entry," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 47(4), pages 420-442, October.
    8. Jared Rubin, 2009. "Social Insurance, Commitment, and the Origin of Law: Interest Bans in Early Christianity," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 52(4), pages 761-786, November.
    9. Mark Koyama, 2024. "Analyzing the medieval church through an economic lens," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 201(1), pages 53-60, October.
    10. Grosjean, Pauline, 2011. "The institutional legacy of the Ottoman Empire: Islamic rule and financial development in South Eastern Europe," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 1-16, March.
    11. Lucky Nugroho & Wiwik Utami & Citra Sukmadilaga & Tettet Fitrijanti, 2017. "The Urgency of Allignment Islamic Bank to Increasing the Outreach (Indonesia Evidence)," International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, Econjournals, vol. 7(4), pages 283-291.
    12. Seror, Avner, 2018. "A theory on the evolution of religious norms and economic prohibition," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 416-427.

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