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A Tale of “Benevolent” Governments: Private Credit Markets, Public Finance, and the Role of Jewish Lenders in Medieval and Renaissance Italy

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  • Botticini, Maristella

Abstract

This article illustrates the impact of Jewish lenders on private credit markets and public finance in medieval and Renaissance Italian towns. In Tuscan private credit markets, Jewish lending helped households to smooth consumption, buy working capital, and provide dowries for daughters. Jewish lenders also helped the public fmances of the communes in which they resided. This article shows that public-finance considerations affected the choice of the interest-rate ceiling Jews were allowed to charge. In many instances, the communes raised the interest-rate ceiling for Jewish lenders in order to tax or borrow the proceeds.

Suggested Citation

  • Botticini, Maristella, 2000. "A Tale of “Benevolent” Governments: Private Credit Markets, Public Finance, and the Role of Jewish Lenders in Medieval and Renaissance Italy," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 60(1), pages 164-189, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:jechis:v:60:y:2000:i:01:p:164-189_02
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    Cited by:

    1. Mark Koyama, 2013. "Preindustrial Cliometrics," Economic Affairs, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(2), pages 268-278, June.
    2. Anderson, R. Warren & Johnson, Noel D & Koyama, Mark, 2013. "From the Persecuting to the Protective State? Jewish Expulsions and Weather Shocks from 1100 to 1800," MPRA Paper 44228, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Garcia, Daniel, 2016. "A Pound of Flesh for the King," MPRA Paper 73266, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Rohner, Dominic, 2011. "Reputation, group structure and social tensions," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(2), pages 188-199, November.
    5. Elisa Borghi & Fabio Gatti & Donato Masciandaro, 2022. "Neither Communes nor Fiefs: King Owned Towns, Right Negotiations and Long Run Persistence. The Case of South Italy," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 22182, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    6. Daniel A. Ackerberg & Maristella Botticini, 2002. "Endogenous Matching and the Empirical Determinants of Contract Form," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(3), pages 564-591, June.
    7. Koyama, Mark, 2010. "Evading the 'Taint of Usury': The usury prohibition as a barrier to entry," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 47(4), pages 420-442, October.
    8. Luigi Pascali, 2016. "Banks and Development: Jewish Communities in the Italian Renaissance and Current Economic Performance," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 98(1), pages 140-158, March.
    9. Vojtěch Müllner & František Svoboda, 2020. "První teorie úvěru a její instituce: dobročinné úvěrové instituce v hospodářských dějinách západu [First Theory of Credit and its Institutions: Benevolent Credit Institutions in an EconomicHistory ," Politická ekonomie, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2020(2), pages 213-236.
    10. Jan Luiten van Zanden & Emanuele Felice, 2017. "Benchmarking the Middle Ages. XV century Tuscany in European Perspective," Working Papers 0081, Utrecht University, Centre for Global Economic History.
    11. Remi Jedwab & Noel D. Johnson & Mark Koyama, 2019. "Negative shocks and mass persecutions: evidence from the Black Death," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 24(4), pages 345-395, December.
    12. Baumol, William J., 2010. "On the allocation of criminal activity to ensure its social benefits," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 32(5), pages 662-669, September.
    13. van Bavel, Bas, 2016. "The Invisible Hand?: How Market Economies have Emerged and Declined Since AD 500," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199608133.
    14. Elisa Borghi & Donato Masciandaro, 2023. "Political Elites, Urban Institutions And Long-Run Persistence : The King Owned Towns," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 23193, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    15. Timur Kuran & Jared Rubin, 2014. "The Financial Power of the Powerless: Socio-Economic Status and Interest Rates under Partial Rule of Law," Working Papers 14-22, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
    16. Gary B. Gorton, 2016. "The History and Economics of Safe Assets," NBER Working Papers 22210, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    17. Reed, Clyde G. & Bekar, Cliff T., 2003. "Religious prohibitions against usury," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 40(4), pages 347-368, October.
    18. Ackerberg, Daniel A. & Botticini, Maristella, 2000. "The Choice of Agrarian Contracts in Early Renaissance Tuscany: Risk Sharing, Moral Hazard, or Capital Market Imperfections?," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 241-257, July.
    19. Luigi Pascali, 2016. "Banks and Development: Jewish Communities in the Italian Renaissance and Current Economic Performance," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 98(1), pages 140-158, March.

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