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CEO duality and firm performance: The moderating roles of other executives and blockholding outside directors

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  • Tang, Jianyun

Abstract

This study examines how the effect of CEO duality on firm performance is affected by two internal governance forces – namely other executives in the top management team and blockholding outside directors. Results based on a longitudinal dataset from the U.S. computer industry were consistent with my hypotheses. Specifically, I found that the effect of CEO duality was negative when the CEO had dominant power relative to other executives and when the board had a blockholding outside director, but was nonsignificant otherwise. This study enriches our understanding of the effect of CEO duality, and helps reinforce the call for the nonduality structure as the default choice and put the burden of proof on those who wish to justify otherwise on special grounds.

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  • Tang, Jianyun, 2017. "CEO duality and firm performance: The moderating roles of other executives and blockholding outside directors," European Management Journal, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 362-372.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:eurman:v:35:y:2017:i:3:p:362-372
    DOI: 10.1016/j.emj.2016.05.003
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