Peer review motivation frames: A qualitative approach
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DOI: 10.1016/j.emj.2015.12.004
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- Kevin M. Kallmes & Waleed Brinjikji & Ahmed T. Ahmed & David F. Kallmes, 2017. "Difficulty in finding manuscript reviewers is not associated with manuscript acceptance rates: a study of the peer-review process at the journal Radiology," Scientometrics, Springer;Akadémiai Kiadó, vol. 111(2), pages 971-978, May.
- Katarina Krapež, 2022. "Advancing Self-Evaluative and Self-Regulatory Mechanisms of Scholarly Journals: Editors’ Perspectives on What Needs to Be Improved in the Editorial Process," Publications, MDPI, vol. 10(1), pages 1-18, March.
- Charles W. Fox, 2017. "Difficulty of recruiting reviewers predicts review scores and editorial decisions at six journals of ecology and evolution," Scientometrics, Springer;Akadémiai Kiadó, vol. 113(1), pages 465-477, October.
- Sergio Copiello, 2018. "On the money value of peer review," Scientometrics, Springer;Akadémiai Kiadó, vol. 115(1), pages 613-620, April.
- Monica Aniela Zaharie & Marco Seeber, 2018. "Are non-monetary rewards effective in attracting peer reviewers? A natural experiment," Scientometrics, Springer;Akadémiai Kiadó, vol. 117(3), pages 1587-1609, December.
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More about this item
Keywords
Peer review; Motivation frame; Review costs and benefits; Thematic analysis; Motivation crowding out; Volunteer dilemma;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
- O15 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration
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