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Ownership unbundling in electricity distribution: The Russian experience

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  • Summanen, Tuomo
  • Arminen, Heli

Abstract

Russia is the first and thus far only country that has separated ownership of electricity distribution and transmission and then, a few years later, reunified these services under one company. We examine the impact of these changes on the quality of service in electricity networks and the operating costs of electricity distribution companies. We find no evidence that ownership unbundling increased the service quality in electricity networks. Furthermore, our results indicate that ownership unbundling resulted in higher operating costs for electricity distribution companies. This study thus contributes to discussion on the importance of the balance of structural remedies and transparent independent regulation in the development of competitive energy markets in emerging market economies.

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  • Summanen, Tuomo & Arminen, Heli, 2018. "Ownership unbundling in electricity distribution: The Russian experience," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 161(C), pages 1199-1210.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:energy:v:161:y:2018:i:c:p:1199-1210
    DOI: 10.1016/j.energy.2018.07.145
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    2. Avdasheva, Svetlana & Orlova, Yulia, 2020. "Effects of long-term tariff regulation on investments under low credibility of rules: Rate-of-return and price cap in Russian electricity grids," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 138(C).

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