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OPEC: Market failure or power failure?

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  • Cairns, Robert D.
  • Calfucura, Enrique

Abstract

The actions of OPEC and Saudi Arabia are discussed in terms of their objectives and their technical and social constraints. It is concluded (1) that OPEC does not act as a cartel and (2) that Hotelling’s rule is not an important feature of pricing or production. OPEC’s (more specifically, Saudi Arabia’s) ideal policy is to keep price moderate to try to assure a market for their high reserves over the long run. Such an action would require heavy investments in capacity, including in excess capacity, for times of interruption of supply from other countries as in the 1990s and for times of high demand as in the 2000s. The action may be inconsistent with other objectives and in any case may be too difficult to achieve.

Suggested Citation

  • Cairns, Robert D. & Calfucura, Enrique, 2012. "OPEC: Market failure or power failure?," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 570-580.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:enepol:v:50:y:2012:i:c:p:570-580
    DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2012.07.058
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