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OPEC and other commodity cartels: a comparison

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  • Alhajji, A. F.
  • Huettner, David

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  • Alhajji, A. F. & Huettner, David, 2000. "OPEC and other commodity cartels: a comparison," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 28(15), pages 1151-1164, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:enepol:v:28:y:2000:i:15:p:1151-1164
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    7. Moran, Theodore H., 1981. "Modeling OPEC behavior: economic and political alternatives," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 35(2), pages 241-272, April.
    8. Loderer, Claudio, 1985. "A Test of the OPEC Cartel Hypothesis: 1974-1983," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 40(3), pages 991-1006, July.
    9. Steven E. Plaut, 1981. "OPEC Is Not a Cartel," Challenge, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 24(5), pages 18-24, November.
    10. A.F. Alhajji & David Huettner, 2000. "The Target Revenue Model and the World Oil Market: Empirical Evidence from 1971 to 1994," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 2), pages 121-144.
    11. Ahmad Saleh Alsalem & Subhash C. Sharma & Marvin D. Troutt, 1997. "Fairness Measures and Importance Weights for Allocating Quotas to OPEC Member Countries," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 2), pages 1-21.
    12. Clifton T. Jones, 1990. "OPEC Behaviour Under Falling Prices: Implications For Cartel Stability," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 3), pages 117-130.
    13. Carol Dahl & Mine Yucel, 1991. "Testing Alternative Hypotheses of Oil Producer Behavior," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 4), pages 117-138.
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    Cited by:

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    2. Oleg Korenok & Stanislav Radchenko, 2005. "The smooth transition autoregressive target zone model with the Gaussian stochastic volatility and TGARCH error terms with applications," Econometrics 0508015, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Coulomb, Renaud & Henriet, Fanny, 2018. "The Grey Paradox: How fossil-fuel owners can benefit from carbon taxation," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 206-223.
    4. Colgan, Jeff D., 2014. "The Emperor Has No Clothes: The Limits of OPEC in the Global Oil Market," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 68(3), pages 599-632, July.
    5. Radetzki, Marian, 2012. "Politics—not OPEC interventions—explain oil's extraordinary price history," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 382-385.
    6. Ferdinand E. Banks, 2004. "Beautiful and not So Beautiful Minds: An Introductory Essay on Economic Theory and the Supply of Oil," OPEC Energy Review, Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, vol. 28(1), pages 27-62, March.
    7. Elbeck, Matt, 2010. "Advancing the design of a dynamic petro-dollar currency basket," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 38(4), pages 1938-1945, April.
    8. Kisswani, Khalid M., 2016. "Does OPEC act as a cartel? Empirical investigation of coordination behavior," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 171-180.
    9. Güntner, Jochen H.F., 2019. "How do oil producers respond to giant oil field discoveries?," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 59-74.
    10. Tang, Linghui & Hammoudeh, Shawkat, 2002. "An empirical exploration of the world oil price under the target zone model," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(6), pages 577-596, November.
    11. Bharati, Rakesh & Crain, Susan J. & Kaminski, Vincent, 2012. "Clustering in crude oil prices and the target pricing zone hypothesis," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(4), pages 1115-1123.
    12. Brémond, Vincent & Hache, Emmanuel & Mignon, Valérie, 2012. "Does OPEC still exist as a cartel? An empirical investigation," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 125-131.
    13. Mew, Michael & Steiner, Gerald & Haneklaus, Nils & Geissler, Bernhard, 2023. "Phosphate price peaks and negotiations – Part 2: The 2008 peak and implications for the future," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 83(C).
    14. Kaufmann, Robert K. & Bradford, Andrew & Belanger, Laura H. & Mclaughlin, John P. & Miki, Yosuke, 2008. "Determinants of OPEC production: Implications for OPEC behavior," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 333-351, March.
    15. Jean-Marc Fournier & Isabell Koske & Isabelle Wanner & Vera Zipperer, 2013. "The Price of Oil – Will it Start Rising Again?," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 1031, OECD Publishing.
    16. Belu Mănescu, Cristiana & Nuño, Galo, 2015. "Quantitative effects of the shale oil revolution," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 855-866.
    17. Cairns, Robert D. & Calfucura, Enrique, 2012. "OPEC: Market failure or power failure?," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 570-580.
    18. Wood, Aaron D. & Mason, Charles F. & Finnoff, David, 2016. "OPEC, the Seven Sisters, and oil market dominance: An evolutionary game theory and agent-based modeling approach," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 132(PB), pages 66-78.
    19. Ghoddusi, Hamed & Nili, Masoud & Rastad, Mahdi, 2017. "On quota violations of OPEC members," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 410-422.
    20. Hochman, Gal & Zilberman, David, 2015. "The political economy of OPEC," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 203-216.
    21. Zhang, Hai-Ying & Ji, Qiang & Fan, Ying, 2014. "Competition, transmission and pattern evolution: A network analysis of global oil trade," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 312-322.
    22. Anton Nakov & Galo Nuño, 2011. "A general equilibrium model of the oil market," Working Papers 1125, Banco de España.
    23. Berk, Istemi & Çam, Eren, 2020. "The shift in global crude oil market structure: A model-based analysis of the period 2013–2017," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 142(C).
    24. Berk, Istemi & Çam , Eren, 2019. "The Shift in Global Crude Oil Market Structure: A model-based analysis of the period 2013–2017," EWI Working Papers 2019-5, Energiewirtschaftliches Institut an der Universitaet zu Koeln (EWI).
    25. Kheiravar, Khaled H, 2019. "Economic and Econometric Analyses of the World Petroleum Industry, Energy Subsidies, and Air Pollution," Institute of Transportation Studies, Working Paper Series qt3gj151w9, Institute of Transportation Studies, UC Davis.

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