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Determinants of the number of bidders in the competitive procurement of electricity supply contracts in the Japanese public sector

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  • Hattori, Toru

Abstract

Since the electricity retail market in Japan was partially opened to competition in 2000, many government entities have sought to solicit competing bids for the electricity supply to their office buildings or facilities, encouraging competition between the incumbents and new entrants. However, in many cases, only the incumbent utility bids for the contract and the competitive effects are limited. This paper presents a statistical analysis of bidders' participation in competitive procurement. We employ several count data regression models to explain the number of bidders other than the local electric utility. Our results suggest that the number of bidders would decrease in response to an increase in the load factor, perhaps because the new entrants are less competitive in serving customers with high load factors as they do not operate low-cost base-load power plants such as nuclear power plants; It would increase along with the voltage level and contract demand. The results also indicate that new entrants are more likely to participate in the bidding process in large city areas.

Suggested Citation

  • Hattori, Toru, 2010. "Determinants of the number of bidders in the competitive procurement of electricity supply contracts in the Japanese public sector," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(6), pages 1299-1305, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:eneeco:v:32:y:2010:i:6:p:1299-1305
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    3. Paul Klemperer, 2004. "Auctions: Theory and Practice," Online economics textbooks, SUNY-Oswego, Department of Economics, number auction1.
    4. Otero, Jesus & Waddams Price, Catherine, 2001. "Price Discrimination, Regulation and Entry in the UK Residential Electricity Market," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(3), pages 161-175, July.
    5. Paul Klemperer, 2004. "Auctions: Theory and Practice," Online economics textbooks, SUNY-Oswego, Department of Economics, number auction1.
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    Cited by:

    1. Hosoe, Nobuhiro & Takagi, Shingo, 2012. "Retail power market competition with endogenous entry decision—An auction data analysis," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 351-368.
    2. Lars Isenhardt & Stefan Seifert & Silke Hüttel, 2023. "Tenant Favoritism and Right of First Refusals in Farmland Auctions: Competition and Price Effects," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 99(2), pages 302-324.
    3. Xiaoli Wang & Yun Liu & Yanbing Ju, 2018. "Sustainable Public Procurement Policies on Promoting Scientific and Technological Innovation in China: Comparisons with the U.S., the UK, Japan, Germany, France, and South Korea," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 10(7), pages 1-27, June.
    4. Shigeharu Okajima & Hiroko Okajima, 2016. "Impact of environmental regulation and the 2011 earthquake on the Japanese electricity industry," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 49(2), pages 223-249, April.
    5. Peng Hao & Jun-Peng Guo & Eoghan O’Neill & Yong-Heng Shi, 2023. "When Will First-Price Work Well? The Impact of Anti-Corruption Rules on Photovoltaic Power Generation Procurement Auctions," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(4), pages 1-24, February.

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