Corporate social responsibility and excess perks

This study examines the effect of mandatory corporate social responsibility (CSR) on firm excess perks by exploiting China's 2008 mandate requiring firms to disclose CSR activities with a difference-in-differences design. We find that firms mandated to report CSR experience a decrease in excess perks subsequent to the mandate. Our empirical results also reveal that the decrease in excessive perks is more pronounced for firms with worse information environments, suggesting that mandatory CSR disclosure significantly reduces executive excessive perks and restricts managers’ unethical behavior by improving the quality of the information environment for investors. Also, we investigate an alternative channel from a managerial human capital dimension and find that reputed CEOs are more likely to regulate their behavior when mandated to disclose more non-financial information. Finally, we find that the mandatory CSR disclosure seems to improve firms’ sensitivity of pay-for-performance but show no impact on excess total cash compensation, suggesting that the improved performance-driven incentives are mainly driven by the reduced excessive perks.