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Corporate governance and executive perquisites

Author

Listed:
  • Angela Andrews
  • Scott Linn
  • Han Yi

Abstract

Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to examine the relation between executive perquisite consumption and indicators of corporate governance after the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) expanded the disclosure requirements related to perquisites. Design/methodology/approach - This study uses ordinary least squares and Tobit regressions to examine the dollar value of perquisites consumed, the number of perquisites consumed and the types of perquisites consumed. Findings - The analysis shows that firms with weak corporate governance are more likely to award perquisites to executives. Firms characterized as being more prone to the presence of agency problems are associated with greater levels of perquisite consumption. Finally, there is evidence that not all perquisite consumptions can be attributed to an agency problem. Efficiently operating firms are associated with greater levels of perquisite consumption as are larger firms. Research limitations/implications - The authors examine firms in the period immediately after the SEC initiated the expanded disclosures. This may limit the generalizability of the results to other exchange-listed firms that changed their perquisite policy as a result of the rule change. Originality/value - The paper extends the literature on corporate governance and mandatory corporate disclosure by investigating the association between corporate governance characteristics and perquisite consumption. This paper examines this relation immediately after the SEC expanded the disclosures surrounding perquisites to provide the public with more transparent disclosures.

Suggested Citation

  • Angela Andrews & Scott Linn & Han Yi, 2017. "Corporate governance and executive perquisites," Review of Accounting and Finance, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 16(1), pages 21-45, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:eme:rafpps:raf-10-2014-0116
    DOI: 10.1108/RAF-10-2014-0116
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Zuo, Ying & Xu, Weidong & Li, Donghui & Fu, Wentao & Lin, Bin, 2022. "Individualism and excess perk consumption: Evidence from China," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
    2. Li, Bin & Yao, Yao & Shahab, Yasir & Li, Hai-Xia & Ntim, Collins G., 2020. "Parent-subsidiary dispersion and executive excess perks consumption," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
    3. Xi, Dan & Wu, Yuze & Wang, Xue & Fu, Zhe, 2023. "Corporate social responsibility and excess perks," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).
    4. Chan, Chia-Ying & Nishikawa, Takeshi & Williams, Thomas C., 2023. "CEO perquisite compensation and M&A performance," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 162-177.
    5. Abiodun Omidiji & Nives Botica Redmayne & Dimu Ehalaiye & Ernest Gyapong, 2024. "Internal audit in microfinance institutions‐ evidence from transitional and developing economies," Economics of Transition and Institutional Change, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 32(1), pages 109-141, January.
    6. Jian, Jianhui & Li, Huaqian & Meng, Leah & Zhao, Chunxiang, 2020. "Do policy burdens induce excessive managerial perks? Evidence from China’s stated-owned enterprises," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 54-65.
    7. Chia-Ying Chan & Iftekhar Hasan & Chih-Yung Lin, 2021. "Agency cost of CEO perquisites in bank loan contracts," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 56(4), pages 1221-1258, May.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Executive compensation; Agency costs; Corporate governance; Perquisites (“Perks”); classification; G34; M52;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects

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