Crowdsourcing contests
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DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2019.02.057
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Krumer, Alex & Megidish, Reut & Sela, Aner, 2023.
"Strategic manipulations in round-robin tournaments,"
Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 50-57.
- Sela, Aner & Krumer, Alex & Megidish, Reut, 2020. "Strategic Manipulations in Round-Robin Tournaments," CEPR Discussion Papers 14412, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Xuhan Tian & Junmin (Jim) Shi & Xiangtong Qi, 2022. "Stochastic Sequential Allocations for Creative Crowdsourcing," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 31(2), pages 697-714, February.
- Palacios-Marqués, Daniel & Gallego-Nicholls, José Fernando & Guijarro-García, María, 2021. "A recipe for success: Crowdsourcing, online social networks, and their impact on organizational performance," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 165(C).
- Ma, Yujie & Du, Gang & Jiao, Roger J., 2020. "Optimal crowdsourcing contracting for reconfigurable process planning in open manufacturing: A bilevel coordinated optimization approach," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 228(C).
- Lars Hornuf & Daniel Vrankar, 2022. "Hourly Wages in Crowdworking: A Meta-Analysis," Business & Information Systems Engineering: The International Journal of WIRTSCHAFTSINFORMATIK, Springer;Gesellschaft für Informatik e.V. (GI), vol. 64(5), pages 553-573, October.
- Wang, Haibo & Alidaee, Bahram, 2023. "White-glove service delivery: A quantitative analysis," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 175(C).
- Naudé, Wim & Bray, Amy & Lee, Celina, 2021. "Crowdsourcing Artificial Intelligence in Africa: Findings from a Machine Learning Contest," IZA Discussion Papers 14545, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- C. Gizem Korpeoglu & Ersin Körpeoğlu & Sıdıka Tunç, 2021. "Optimal Duration of Innovation Contests," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 23(3), pages 657-675, May.
- Hou, Ting & Zhang, Wen, 2021. "Optimal two-stage elimination contests for crowdsourcing," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 145(C).
- Ratul Lahkar & Rezina Sultana, 2023. "Rent dissipation in large population Tullock contests," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 197(1), pages 253-282, October.
- Dargahi, Rambod & Namin, Aidin & Ketron, Seth C. & Saint Clair, Julian K., 2021. "Is self-knowledge the ultimate prize? A quantitative analysis of participation choice in online ideation crowdsourcing contests," Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
- Bo Chen & Emilios Galariotis & Lijun Ma & Zijia Wang & Zhaobo Zhu, 2023. "On disclosure of participation in innovation contests: a dominance result," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 328(2), pages 1615-1629, September.
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Keywords
Game theory; Crowdsourcing; Contest; All-pay auction;All these keywords.
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