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Markets for Ideas: Prize Structure, Entry Limits, and the Design of Ideation Contests

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  • Pavel Kireyev

    (Harvard Business School)

Abstract

Contests are a popular mechanism for the procurement of innovation. In marketing, design, and other creative industries, firms use freelance marketplaces to organize contests and obtain high-quality ideas for ads, new products, and even business strategies from participants. A central question faced by contest sponsors is how to appropriately structure prizes and entry regulations. I develop an empirical model of idea generation (ideation) contests and investigate the impact of the number of prizes, prize amount, and submission limit on participation and quality outcomes using data from a popular marketing ideation platform. The model explains participant submission decisions, jury ratings, and sponsor rankings of winning submissions. Counterfactuals reveal the impact of design parameters on outcomes and provide guidance for the optimal design of ideation contests and platforms.

Suggested Citation

  • Pavel Kireyev, 2016. "Markets for Ideas: Prize Structure, Entry Limits, and the Design of Ideation Contests," Harvard Business School Working Papers 16-129, Harvard Business School.
    • Handle: RePEc:hbs:wpaper:16-129
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Keywords

    idea generation; crowdsourcing; contest design; structural estimation.;
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