Optimal patent policy in the presence of vertical separation
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DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2018.03.027
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- Ebina, Takeshi & Matsushima, Noriaki & Nishide, Katsumasa, 2022.
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- Takeshi Ebina & Noriaki Matsushima & Katsumasa Nishide, 2017. "Demand uncertainty, product differentiation, and entry timing under spatial competition," ISER Discussion Paper 1007r, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Jul 2018.
- Yang, Huixiao & Chen, Wenbo, 2020. "Game modes and investment cost locations in radio-frequency identification (RFID) adoption," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 286(3), pages 883-896.
- Jeon, Haejun, 2019. "Patent protection and R&D subsidy under asymmetric information," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 332-354.
- Ma, Siyu & Sen, Debapriya & Tauman, Yair, 2022. "Optimal patent licensing: from three to two part tariffs," MPRA Paper 111624, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Toraubally, Waseem A., 2023. "Comparative advantage with many goods: New treatment and results," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 311(3), pages 1188-1201.
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Keywords
OR in research and development; Patent policy; License bargaining; Vertical separation; Real options;All these keywords.
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