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Co-development ventures: Optimal time of entry and profit-sharing

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  • Cvitanic, Jaksa
  • Radas, Sonja
  • Sikic, Hrvoje

Abstract

We find the optimal time for entering a joint venture by two firms, and the optimal linear contract for sharing the profits. We consider risk-sharing, timing-incentive and asymmetric decisions contract designs. If the firms are risk-neutral and the cash payments are allowed, all three designs are equivalent. With risk aversion, the optimal contract parameters may vary significantly across the three designs and across varying levels of risk aversion. We also analyze a dataset of joint biomedical ventures, in which, in agreement with our theoretical predictions, both royalty and cash payments are mostly increasing in the smaller firm's experience, and the time of entry happens sooner for more experienced small firms.

Suggested Citation

  • Cvitanic, Jaksa & Radas, Sonja & Sikic, Hrvoje, 2011. "Co-development ventures: Optimal time of entry and profit-sharing," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 35(10), pages 1710-1730, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:35:y:2011:i:10:p:1710-1730
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    3. Morreale, Azzurra & Robba, Serena & Lo Nigro, Giovanna & Roma, Paolo, 2017. "A real options game of alliance timing decisions in biopharmaceutical research and development," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 261(3), pages 1189-1202.
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    6. Elmar Lukas & Andreas Welling, 2012. "On the Investment-Uncertainty Relationship: A Game Theoretic Real Option Approach," FEMM Working Papers 120030, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management.
    7. Dimitrios Zormpas, 2021. "Jointly Held Investment Options and Vertical Relationships," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 58(4), pages 513-530, June.

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