IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/ejores/v229y2013i1p230-238.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Cooperative game theoretic centrality analysis of terrorist networks: The cases of Jemaah Islamiyah and Al Qaeda

Author

Listed:
  • Lindelauf, R.H.A.
  • Hamers, H.J.M.
  • Husslage, B.G.M.

Abstract

The identification of key players in a terrorist organization aids in preventing attacks, the efficient allocation of surveillance measures, and the destabilization of the corresponding network. In this paper, we introduce a game theoretic approach to identify key players in terrorist networks. In particular we use the Shapley value as a measure of importance in cooperative games that are specifically designed to reflect the context of the terrorist organization at hand. The advantage of this approach is that both the structure of the terrorist network, which usually reflects a communication and interaction structure, as well as non-network features, i.e., individual based parameters such as financial means or bomb building skills, can be taken into account. The application of our methodology to the analysis results in rankings of the terrorists in the network. We illustrate our methodology through two case studies: Jemaah Islamiyah’s Bali bombing and Al Qaedas 9/11 attack, which lead to new insights in the operational networks responsible for these attacks.

Suggested Citation

  • Lindelauf, R.H.A. & Hamers, H.J.M. & Husslage, B.G.M., 2013. "Cooperative game theoretic centrality analysis of terrorist networks: The cases of Jemaah Islamiyah and Al Qaeda," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 229(1), pages 230-238.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ejores:v:229:y:2013:i:1:p:230-238
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2013.02.032
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0377221713001653
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.ejor.2013.02.032?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rafael Amer & José Miguel Giménez, 2004. "A connectivity game for graphs," Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research (GOR);Nederlands Genootschap voor Besliskunde (NGB), vol. 60(3), pages 453-470, December.
    2. Gomez, Daniel & Gonzalez-Aranguena, Enrique & Manuel, Conrado & Owen, Guillermo & del Pozo, Monica & Tejada, Juan, 2003. "Centrality and power in social networks: a game theoretic approach," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 27-54, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. González–Arangüena, Enrique & Manuel, Conrado Miguel & del Pozo, Mónica, 2015. "Values of games with weighted graphs," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 243(1), pages 248-257.
    2. Gusev, Vasily V., 2021. "Nash-stable coalition partition and potential functions in games with coalition structure," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 295(3), pages 1180-1188.
    3. Arcagni, Alberto & Grassi, Rosanna & Stefani, Silvana & Torriero, Anna, 2017. "Higher order assortativity in complex networks," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 262(2), pages 708-719.
    4. László Csató, 2017. "Measuring centrality by a generalization of degree," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 25(4), pages 771-790, December.
    5. Nizar Allouch & A. Meca & K. Polotskaya, 2021. "The Bonacich Shapley centrality," Studies in Economics 2106, School of Economics, University of Kent.
    6. Mágó, Mánuel, 2018. "Power values and framing in game theory," Other publications TiSEM e7822a6b-a2db-4ce9-bd08-b, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    7. Sylvain Béal & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal, 2015. "Discounted Tree Solutions," Working Papers hal-01377923, HAL.
    8. Giulia Cesari & Roberto Lucchetti & Stefano Moretti, 2017. "Generalized additive games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(4), pages 919-939, November.
    9. Tom C. van der Zanden & Hans L. Bodlaender & Herbert J. M. Hamers, 2023. "Efficiently computing the Shapley value of connectivity games in low-treewidth graphs," Operational Research, Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 1-23, March.
    10. Stefano Moretti & Henk Norde, 2022. "Some new results on generalized additive games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 51(1), pages 87-118, March.
    11. Husslage, B.G.M. & Borm, P.E.M. & Burg, T. & Hamers, H.J.M. & Lindelauf, R., 2014. "Ranking Terrorists in Networks : A Sensitivity Analysis of Al Qaeda’s 9/11 Attack," Other publications TiSEM 191548ed-34ba-4aba-abbf-9, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    12. Encarnacion Algaba & Rene van den Brink, 2021. "Networks, Communication and Hierarchy: Applications to Cooperative Games," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 21-019/IV, Tinbergen Institute.
    13. Ramón Flores & Elisenda Molina & Juan Tejada, 2019. "Evaluating groups with the generalized Shapley value," 4OR, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 141-172, June.
    14. Sushil Gupta & Martin K. Starr & Reza Zanjirani Farahani & Mahsa Mahboob Ghodsi, 2020. "Prevention of Terrorism–An Assessment of Prior POM Work and Future Potentials," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 29(7), pages 1789-1815, July.
    15. Hamers, Herbert & Husslage, Bart & Lindelauf, R. & Campen, Tjeerd, 2016. "A New Approximation Method for the Shapley Value Applied to the WTC 9/11 Terrorist Attack," Discussion Paper 2016-042, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    16. Molina, Elisenda & Tejada, Juan, 2013. "The Shapley group value," DES - Working Papers. Statistics and Econometrics. WS ws133430, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Estadística.
    17. Hu, Fei & Zhao, Shangmei & Bing, Tao & Chang, Yiming, 2017. "Hierarchy in industrial structure: The cases of China and the USA," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 469(C), pages 871-882.
    18. Hamers, Herbert & Husslage, Bart & Lindelauf, R. & Campen, Tjeerd, 2016. "A New Approximation Method for the Shapley Value Applied to the WTC 9/11 Terrorist Attack," Other publications TiSEM 8a67b416-1091-4efe-a1a6-7, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    19. Zenou, Yves, 2014. "Key Players," CEPR Discussion Papers 10277, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    20. Ali Tosyali & Jeongsub Choi & Byunghoon Kim & Hoshin Lee & Myong K. Jeong, 2021. "A dynamic graph-based approach to ranking firms for identifying key players using inter-firm transactions," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 303(1), pages 5-27, August.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Lindelauf, R. & Hamers, H.J.M. & Husslage, B.G.M., 2011. "Game Theoretic Centrality Analysis of Terrorist Networks : The Cases of Jemaah Islamiyah and Al Qaeda," Other publications TiSEM e91f6269-bcac-4790-b42f-3, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    2. Lindelauf, R. & Hamers, H.J.M. & Husslage, B.G.M., 2011. "Game Theoretic Centrality Analysis of Terrorist Networks : The Cases of Jemaah Islamiyah and Al Qaeda," Discussion Paper 2011-107, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    3. Felix Fritz & Stefano Moretti & Jochen Staudacher, 2023. "Social Ranking Problems at the Interplay between Social Choice Theory and Coalitional Games," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 11(24), pages 1-22, December.
    4. Sridhar Mandyam & Usha Sridhar, 2017. "DON and Shapley Value for Allocation among Cooperating Agents in a Network: Conditions for Equivalence," Studies in Microeconomics, , vol. 5(2), pages 143-161, December.
    5. C. Manuel & D. Martín, 2021. "A value for communication situations with players having different bargaining abilities," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 301(1), pages 161-182, June.
    6. Trudeau, Christian & Vidal-Puga, Juan, 2020. "Clique games: A family of games with coincidence between the nucleolus and the Shapley value," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 8-14.
    7. Husslage, B.G.M. & Lindelauf, R. & Hamers, H.J.M., 2012. "Leaderless Covert Networks : A Quantitative Approach," Other publications TiSEM c4111fba-0f6c-42cd-976a-1, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    8. Wen, Xiangxi & Tu, Congliang & Wu, Minggong, 2018. "Node importance evaluation in aviation network based on “No Return” node deletion method," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 503(C), pages 546-559.
    9. Harald Wiese, 2009. "Applying cooperative game theory to power relations," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 43(4), pages 519-533, July.
    10. E. C. Gavilán & C. Manuel & R. Brink, 2023. "Directed communication in games with directed graphs," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 31(3), pages 584-617, October.
    11. Aguiar, Victor H. & Pongou, Roland & Tondji, Jean-Baptiste, 2018. "A non-parametric approach to testing the axioms of the Shapley value with limited data," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 41-63.
    12. Stefano Moretti & Fioravante Patrone, 2008. "Transversality of the Shapley value," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 16(1), pages 1-41, July.
    13. René van den Brink & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2017. "The degree measure as utility function over positions in networks," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 17035, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
    14. Belik, Ivan & Jörnsten, Kurt, 2015. "The Analysis of Leadership Formation in Networks Based on Shapley Value," Discussion Papers 2015/2, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science.
    15. Julia Belau, 2018. "The class of ASN-position values," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 50(1), pages 65-99, January.
    16. René Van Den Brink & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2023. "Degree Centrality, von Neumann-Morgenstern Expected Utility and Externalities in Networks," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 23012r, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne, revised Jun 2024.
    17. René Brink & Gerard Laan & Vitaly Pruzhansky, 2011. "Harsanyi power solutions for graph-restricted games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 40(1), pages 87-110, February.
    18. Oskar Skibski & Tomasz Michalak, 2020. "Fair division in the presence of externalities," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(1), pages 147-172, March.
    19. Gómez, Daniel & Figueira, José Rui & Eusébio, Augusto, 2013. "Modeling centrality measures in social network analysis using bi-criteria network flow optimization problems," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 226(2), pages 354-365.
    20. Belik, Ivan & Jörnsten, Kurt, 2016. "The method of leader's overthrow in networks based on Shapley value," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 55-66.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ejores:v:229:y:2013:i:1:p:230-238. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/eor .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.