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Reducing incremental costs associated with the delegation of incentive contracting decisions: An analysis of planning and control decisions in a manufacturing setting in the presence of moral hazard

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  • Natarajan, Ramachandran
  • Sethuraman, Kannan
  • Surysekar, Krishnamurthy

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  • Natarajan, Ramachandran & Sethuraman, Kannan & Surysekar, Krishnamurthy, 2005. "Reducing incremental costs associated with the delegation of incentive contracting decisions: An analysis of planning and control decisions in a manufacturing setting in the presence of moral hazard," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 162(3), pages 816-838, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ejores:v:162:y:2005:i:3:p:816-838
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    1. Itoh Hideshi, 1993. "Coalitions, Incentives, and Risk Sharing," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 410-427, August.
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    3. Caillaud, Bernard & Rey, Patrick, 1995. "Strategic aspects of vertical delegation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(3-4), pages 421-431, April.
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    8. Robert Gibbons, 1998. "Incentives in Organizations," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 115-132, Fall.
    9. van Ackere, Ann, 1993. "The principal/agent paradigm: Its relevance to various functional fields," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 83-103, October.
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    11. Evan L. Porteus & Seungjin Whang, 1991. "On Manufacturing/Marketing Incentives," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 37(9), pages 1166-1181, September.
    12. Todd R. Zenger & William S. Hesterly, 1997. "The Disaggregation of Corporations: Selective Intervention, High-Powered Incentives, and Molecular Units," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 8(3), pages 209-222, June.
    13. Baiman, S & Larcker, Df & Rajan, Mv, 1995. "Organizational Design For Business Units," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(2), pages 205-229.
    14. Alex Thevaranjan & Kissan Joseph, 1999. "Incentives and job redesign: the case of the personal selling function," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 20(4), pages 205-216.
    15. Baiman, S & Demski, Js, 1980. "Economically Optimal Performance Evaluation And Control-Systems," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18, pages 184-220.
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    Cited by:

    1. Robert Carden & Sonia E. Leach & Jeffrey S. Smith, 2008. "A market reaction to DOD contract delay — Does the market reward poor performance?," Review of Financial Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 17(1), pages 33-45.
    2. Carden, Robert & Leach, Sonia E. & Smith, Jeffrey S., 2008. "A market reaction to DOD contract delay -- Does the market reward poor performance," Review of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 33-45.
    3. Arve, Malin & Honryo, Takakazu, 2022. "Wasteful procedures?," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).

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