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Optimal shared-savings contracts in supply chains: Linear contracts and double moral hazard

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  • Corbett, Charles J.
  • DeCroix, Gregory A.
  • Ha, Albert Y.

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  • Corbett, Charles J. & DeCroix, Gregory A. & Ha, Albert Y., 2005. "Optimal shared-savings contracts in supply chains: Linear contracts and double moral hazard," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 163(3), pages 653-667, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ejores:v:163:y:2005:i:3:p:653-667
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    14. Charles J. Corbett & Gregory A. DeCroix, 2001. "Shared-Savings Contracts for Indirect Materials in Supply Chains: Channel Profits and Environmental Impacts," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 47(7), pages 881-893, July.
    15. Mann, Duncan P. & Wissink, Jennifer P., 1990. "Hidden actions and hidden characteristics in warranty markets," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 53-71.
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