Reputation for quality and adverse selection
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2015.02.001
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Maarten C. W. Janssen & Santanu Roy, 2002. "Dynamic Trading in a Durable Good Market with Asymmetric Information," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 43(1), pages 257-282, February.
- Gul, Faruk, 2001.
"Unobservable Investment and the Hold-Up Problem,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(2), pages 343-376, March.
- F. Gul, 2000. "Unobservable Investment and the Hold-Up Problem," Princeton Economic Theory Papers 00s10, Economics Department, Princeton University.
- Giovanni Maggi & Andres Rodriguez-Clare, 1995. "Costly Distortion of Information in Agency Problems," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(4), pages 675-689, Winter.
- Jeffrey Ely & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2008.
"When is reputation bad?,"
World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 10, pages 177-205,
World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Ely, Jeffrey & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 2008. "When is reputation bad?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 498-526, July.
- Jeffery Ely & Drew Fudenberg & David Levine, 2002. "When is Reputation Bad?," Discussion Papers 1358, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Jeffrey Ely & Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2005. "When is Reputation Bad," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000016, David K. Levine.
- Jeffrey Ely & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2004. "When is Reputation Bad?," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2035, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Levine, David & Ely, Jeffrey & Fudenberg, Drew, 2008. "When is Reputation Bad?," Scholarly Articles 3196337, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Jeffrey Ely & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2002. "When is Reputation Bad?," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1962, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Jeffrey C. Ely & Juuso Välimäki, 2003.
"Bad Reputation,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 118(3), pages 785-814.
- Jeffrey Ely & Jusso Valimaki, 2002. "Bad Reputation," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 391749000000000514, www.najecon.org.
- Jeffrey Ely & Jusso Valimaki, 2002. "Bad Reputation," Levine's Working Paper Archive 391749000000000514, David K. Levine.
- Jeffrey C. Ely & Juuso Valimaki, 2002. "Bad Reputation," Discussion Papers 1348, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Kawai, Keiichi, 2014.
"Dynamic market for lemons with endogenous quality choice by the seller,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 152-162.
- Kawai, Keiichi, 2011. "Dynamic Market for Lemons with Endogenous Quality Choice by the Seller," MPRA Paper 29688, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Benjamin E. Hermalin, 2013. "Unobserved investment, endogenous quality, and trade," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 44(1), pages 33-55, March.
- Patrick Gonzàlez, 2004.
"Investment and Screening Under Asymmetric Endogenous Information,"
RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(3), pages 502-519, Autumn.
- González, Patrick, 2002. "Investment and Screening under Asymmetric Endogenous Information," Cahiers de recherche 0204, Université Laval - Département d'économique.
- Gonzalez, Patrick, 2002. "Investment and Screening under Asymmetric Endogenous Information," Cahiers de recherche 0201, GREEN.
- Hartman-Glaser, Barney & Piskorski, Tomasz & Tchistyi, Alexei, 2012. "Optimal securitization with moral hazard," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 104(1), pages 186-202.
- Haubrich, Joseph G, 1988.
"Optimal Financial Structure in Exchange Economies,"
International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 29(2), pages 217-235, May.
- Joseph Haubrich, "undated". "Optimal Financial Structure in Exchange Economies," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 18-84, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
- Myerson, Roger B. & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1983.
"Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 265-281, April.
- Roger B. Myerson & Mark A. Satterthwaite, 1981. "Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading," Discussion Papers 469S, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002.
"On the Interplay of Hidden Action and Hidden Information in Simple Bilateral Trading Problems,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(2), pages 444-460, April.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "On the Interplay of Hidden Action and Hidden Information in Simple Bilateral Trading Problems," MPRA Paper 12531, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Leland, Hayne E & Pyle, David H, 1977.
"Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation,"
Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 32(2), pages 371-387, May.
- Hayne E. Leland and David H. Pyle., 1976. "Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation," Research Program in Finance Working Papers 41, University of California at Berkeley.
- Johannes Hörner & Nicolas Vieille, 2009.
"Public vs. Private Offers in the Market for Lemons,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 77(1), pages 29-69, January.
- Johannes Hoerner & Nicolas Vieille, 2006. "Public vs. Private Offers in the Market for Lemons," 2006 Meeting Papers 813, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Nicolas Vieille & Johannes Hörner, 2009. "Public vs. Private Offers in the Market for Lemons," Post-Print hal-00464577, HAL.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2010.
"Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(5), pages 807-816, September.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2009. "Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments," CEPR Discussion Papers 7584, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2010. "On contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments," MPRA Paper 23157, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Harold L. Cole & Narayana R. Kocherlakota, 2001.
"Efficient Allocations with Hidden Income and Hidden Storage,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 68(3), pages 523-542.
- Harold L. Cole & Narayana R. Kocherlakota, 1999. "Efficient allocations with hidden income and hidden storage," Staff Report 238, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Harold L Cole & Narayana Kocherlakota, 2010. "Efficient Allocations with Hidden Income and Hidden Storage," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1909, David K. Levine.
- V.V. Chari & Ali Shourideh & Ariel Zetlin-Jones, 2010. "Adverse Selection, Reputation and Sudden Collapses in Secondary Loan Markets," NBER Working Papers 16080, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1990.
"Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1279-1319, November.
- Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1988. "Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts," Working papers 494, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Joel S. Demski & David E.M. Sappington, 1991. "Resolving Double Moral Hazard Problems with Buyout Agreements," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(2), pages 232-240, Summer.
- Simon Board & Moritz Meyer‐ter‐Vehn, 2013.
"Reputation for Quality,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(6), pages 2381-2462, November.
- Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn & Simon Board, 2009. "Reputation for Quality," 2009 Meeting Papers 160, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Peter DeMarzo & Darrell Duffie, 1999. "A Liquidity-Based Model of Security Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(1), pages 65-100, January.
- Allen, Franklin, 1985. "Repeated principal-agent relationships with lending and borrowing," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 17(1-2), pages 27-31.
- Stephanie Lau, 2008. "Information and bargaining in the hold‐up problem," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(1), pages 266-282, March.
- Benjamin J. Keys & Tanmoy Mukherjee & Amit Seru & Vikrant Vig, 2010. "Did Securitization Lead to Lax Screening? Evidence from Subprime Loans," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 125(1), pages 307-362.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Hechem Ajmi & Salina Kassim & Hassanuddeen Abdul Aziz & Walid Mansour, 2019. "A Literature Review of Financial Contracting Theory from the Islamic and Conventional Overviews: Contributions, Gaps, and Perspectives استعراض أدبيات نظرية التعاقد المالي من المنظور الإسلامي والتقليدي," Journal of King Abdulaziz University: Islamic Economics, King Abdulaziz University, Islamic Economics Institute., vol. 32(2), pages 25-42, January.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Kawai, Keiichi, 2014.
"Dynamic market for lemons with endogenous quality choice by the seller,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 152-162.
- Kawai, Keiichi, 2011. "Dynamic Market for Lemons with Endogenous Quality Choice by the Seller," MPRA Paper 29688, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Maria Goltsman, 2011. "Optimal information transmission in a holdup problem," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 42(3), pages 495-526, September.
- Rao, Neel, 2022. "Search equilibrium with unobservable investment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 300-330.
- Erol Akçay & Adam Meirowitz & Kristopher W. Ramsay, 2018. "Two-sided unobservable investment, bargaining, and efficiency," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 22(3), pages 123-147, December.
- Lau, Stephanie, 2011. "Investment incentives in bilateral trading," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 538-552.
- Rao, Neel, 2015. "General training in labor markets: Common value auctions with unobservable investment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 19-45.
- Attar, Andrea & Mariotti, Thomas & Salanié, François, 2021.
"Competitive Nonlinear Pricing under Adverse Selection,"
TSE Working Papers
21-1201, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Aug 2022.
- Andrea Attar & Thomas Mariotti & François Salanié, 2022. "Competitive nonlinear pricing under adverse selection," Working Papers hal-03629592, HAL.
- Hibbeln, Martin & Osterkamp, Werner, 2024. "The Impact of Risk Retention on Moral Hazard in the Securitization Market," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 163(C).
- Matthew J. Botsch, 2022. "Public and Private Benefits of Information in Markets for Securitized Assets," Eastern Economic Journal, Palgrave Macmillan;Eastern Economic Association, vol. 48(3), pages 319-365, June.
- Brendan Daley & Brett Green & Victoria Vanasco, 2020. "Securitization, Ratings, and Credit Supply," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 75(2), pages 1037-1082, April.
- Yunzhi Hu & Felipe Varas, 2021. "A Theory of Zombie Lending," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 76(4), pages 1813-1867, August.
- Stephanie Rosenkranz & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2007.
"Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation?,"
Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 74(296), pages 573-585, November.
- Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2004. "Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation?," CEPR Discussion Papers 4263, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2006. "Can Coasean bargaining justify Pigouvian taxation?," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 7/2006, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
- Vladimir Asriyan & Victoria Vanasco, 2019.
"Security Design in Non-Exclusive Markets with Asymmetric Information,"
Working Papers
1164, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Vladimir Asriyan & Victoria Vanasco, 2019. "Security design in non-exclusive markets with asymmetric information," Economics Working Papers 1712, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Jun 2021.
- Vanasco, Victoria & Asriyan, Vladimir, 2020. "Security design in non-exclusive markets with asymmetric information," CEPR Discussion Papers 14306, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Pagès, Henri, 2013.
"Bank monitoring incentives and optimal ABS,"
Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 30-54.
- Pagès, H., 2009. "Bank incentives and optimal CDOs," Working papers 253, Banque de France.
- Pagès, H., 2012. "Bank monitoring incentives and optimal ABS," Working papers 377, Banque de France.
- Manuel Adelino & Kristopher Gerardi & Barney Hartman-Glaser, 2016.
"Are Lemons Sold First? Dynamic Signaling in the Mortgage Market,"
FRB Atlanta Working Paper
2016-8, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
- Manuel Adelino & Kristopher Gerardi & Barney Hartman-Glaser, 2018. "Are Lemons Sold First? Dynamic Signaling in the Mortgage Market," NBER Working Papers 24180, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Sascha Tobias Wengerek & Benjamin Hippert & André Uhde, 2019. "Risk allocation through securitization - Evidence from non-performing loans," Working Papers Dissertations 58, Paderborn University, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics.
- Hartman-Glaser, Barney & Piskorski, Tomasz & Tchistyi, Alexei, 2012. "Optimal securitization with moral hazard," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 104(1), pages 186-202.
- Kuncl, Martin, 2019.
"Securitization under asymmetric information over the business cycle,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 237-256.
- Martin Kuncl, 2014. "Securitization under Asymmetric Information over the Business Cycle," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp506, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
- Martin Kuncl, 2015. "Securitization under Asymmetric Information over the Business Cycle," Staff Working Papers 15-9, Bank of Canada.
- Bougheas, Spiros & Worrall, Tim, 2012.
"Cost padding in regulated monopolies,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 331-341.
- Spiros Bougheas & Tim Worrall, 2001. "Cost Padding in Regulated Monopolies," Keele Department of Economics Discussion Papers (1995-2001) 2001/07, Department of Economics, Keele University, revised Nov 2001.
- Fuchs, William & Green, Brett & Papanikolaou, Dimitris, 2016.
"Adverse selection, slow-moving capital, and misallocation,"
Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 120(2), pages 286-308.
- Dimitris Papanikolaou & Brett Green & William Fuchs, 2014. "Adverse Selection, Slow Moving Capital and Misallocation," 2014 Meeting Papers 124, Society for Economic Dynamics.
More about this item
Keywords
Adverse selection; Moral hazard;Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:76:y:2015:i:c:p:47-59. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/eer .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.