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Optimal securitization with moral hazard

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  • Hartman-Glaser, Barney
  • Piskorski, Tomasz
  • Tchistyi, Alexei

Abstract

We consider the optimal design of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) in a dynamic setting in which a mortgage underwriter with limited liability can engage in costly hidden effort to screen borrowers and can sell loans to investors. We show that (i) the timing of payments to the underwriter is the key incentive mechanism, (ii) the maturity of the optimal contract can be short, and that (iii) bundling mortgages is efficient as it allows investors to learn about underwriter effort more quickly, an information enhancement effect. Finally, we demonstrate that the optimal contract can be closely approximated by the “first loss piece.”

Suggested Citation

  • Hartman-Glaser, Barney & Piskorski, Tomasz & Tchistyi, Alexei, 2012. "Optimal securitization with moral hazard," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 104(1), pages 186-202.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:104:y:2012:i:1:p:186-202
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.12.007
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Security design; Mortgage backed securities; Moral hazard;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage

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