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Optimal Financial Structure in Exchange Economies

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  • Haubrich, Joseph G

Abstract

This paper examines the financial arrangements that arise in a simple exchange economy with private information. It uses contr act theory to consider the optimal structures under varying informati onal restrictions. Relative to previous work, it expands the strategy sets of agents, allowing both coalitions and contrived uncertainty ( lotteries). The paper spells out how different information structures lead to different constraints (resource, incentive compatibility, mu ltilateral incentive compatibility) upon the problem, and thus to dif ferent financial contracts (insurance, intermediaries, ex post market s). Multilateral incentive compatibility emerges as particularly powe rful in determining the nature of financial contracts. Copyright 1988 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.

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  • Haubrich, Joseph G, 1988. "Optimal Financial Structure in Exchange Economies," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 29(2), pages 217-235, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:29:y:1988:i:2:p:217-35
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    Cited by:

    1. David Andolfatto & Aleksander Berentsen & Fernando M Martin, 2020. "Money, Banking, and Financial Markets," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 87(5), pages 2049-2086.
    2. Peter J. Hammond, "undated". "Multilaterally Strategy-Proof Mechanisms in Random Aumann--Hildenbrand Macroeconomies," Working Papers 97022, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
    3. Kawai, Keiichi, 2015. "Reputation for quality and adverse selection," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 47-59.
    4. William P. Osterberg, 1992. "Intervention and the bid-ask spread in G-3 foreign exchange rates," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, vol. 28(Q II), pages 2-13.
    5. Pamela Labadie, 2007. "Anonymity and Individual Risk," 2007 Meeting Papers 637, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    6. Peck, James & Shell, Karl, 2010. "Could making banks hold only liquid assets induce bank runs?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(4), pages 420-427, May.
    7. Zimper Alexander, 2013. "Optimal Liquidity Provision Through a Demand Deposit Scheme: The Jacklin Critique Revisited," German Economic Review, De Gruyter, vol. 14(1), pages 89-107, February.
    8. Cooper, Russell & Ross, Thomas W., 1998. "Bank runs: Liquidity costs and investment distortions," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 27-38, February.
    9. James Peck & Karl Shell, 2003. "Bank Portfolio Restrictions and Equilibrium Bank Runs," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000077, UCLA Department of Economics.
    10. Labadie, Pamela, 2009. "Anonymity and individual risk," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(6), pages 2440-2453, November.
    11. Pamela Labadie, 2008. "Retrading in Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection," 2008 Meeting Papers 838, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    12. Joseph G. Haubrich, 1992. "Sluggish deposit rates: endogenous institutions and aggregate fluctuations," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, vol. 28(Q II), pages 23-35.

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