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(In)accuracy of a European political stock market: The influence of common value structures

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  • Jacobsen, Ben
  • Potters, Jan
  • Schram, Arthur
  • van Winden, Frans
  • Wit, Jorgen

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  • Jacobsen, Ben & Potters, Jan & Schram, Arthur & van Winden, Frans & Wit, Jorgen, 2000. "(In)accuracy of a European political stock market: The influence of common value structures," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 205-230, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:44:y:2000:i:2:p:205-230
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Forsythe, Robert & Forrest Nelson & George R. Neumann & Jack Wright, 1992. "Anatomy of an Experimental Political Stock Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(5), pages 1142-1161, December.
    2. Kagel, John H. & Levin, Dan, 1986. "The Winner's Curse and Public Information in Common Value Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(5), pages 894-920, December.
    3. Heath, Chip & Tversky, Amos, 1991. "Preference and Belief: Ambiguity and Competence in Choice under Uncertainty," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 4(1), pages 5-28, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Boulu-Reshef, Béatrice & Comeig, Irene & Donze, Robert & Weiss, Gregory D., 2016. "Risk aversion in prediction markets: A framed-field experiment," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 69(11), pages 5071-5075.
    2. Hauser, Florian & Huber, Jürgen, 2012. "Short-selling constraints as cause for price distortions: An experimental study," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 1279-1298.
    3. Jan Hansen & Carsten Schmidt & Martin Strobel, 2004. "Manipulation in political stock markets - preconditions and evidence," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 11(7), pages 459-463.
    4. Michael Berlemann & Kalina Dimitrova & Nikolay Nenovsky, 2000. "Assessing Market Expectations on Exchange Rates and Inflation: A Pilot Forecasting System for Bulgaria," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series wp759, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    5. Eyster, Erik & Rabin, Matt, 2002. "Cursed Equilibrium," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt6xf4782t, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
    6. Corgnet, Brice & Deck, Cary & DeSantis, Mark & Porter, David, 2018. "Information (non)aggregation in markets with costly signal acquisition," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 286-320.
    7. Erik Eyster & Matthew Rabin, 2005. "Cursed Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(5), pages 1623-1672, September.
    8. Berlemann, Michael & Schmidt, Carsten, 2001. "Predictive accuracy of political stock markets: Empirical evidence from an European perspective," Dresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics 05/01, Technische Universität Dresden, Faculty of Business and Economics, Department of Economics.
    9. Gregor Bruggelambert, 2004. "Information and efficiency in political stock markets: using computerized markets to predict election results," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 36(7), pages 753-768.
    10. Patrick Buckley & Fergal O’Brien, 0. "The effect of malicious manipulations on prediction market accuracy," Information Systems Frontiers, Springer, vol. 0, pages 1-13.
    11. Khan, Urmee & Lieli, Robert P., 2018. "Information flow between prediction markets, polls and media: Evidence from the 2008 presidential primaries," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 34(4), pages 696-710.
    12. Patrick Buckley & Fergal O’Brien, 2017. "The effect of malicious manipulations on prediction market accuracy," Information Systems Frontiers, Springer, vol. 19(3), pages 611-623, June.

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