Labor and credit contracts with asymmetric information and bankruptcy
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- Theofanis Tsoulouhas, "undated". "Labor and Credit Contracts with Asymmetric Information and Bankruptcy," Working Paper Series 20, North Carolina State University, Department of Economics.
References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Tribo Gine, José Antonio, 1997. "Long-term and short-term labor contracts versus long-term and short-term debt financial contracts," DEE - Working Papers. Business Economics. WB 7027, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de EconomÃa de la Empresa.
- Marinakis, Kosmas & Tsoulouhas, Theofanis, 2013.
"Are tournaments optimal over piece rates under limited liability for the principal?,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 223-237.
- Kosmas Marinakis & Theofanis Tsoulouhas, 2006. "Are Tournaments Optimal over Piece Rates under Limited Liability for the Principal?," Working Paper Series 009, North Carolina State University, Department of Economics, revised Sep 2006.
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