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Long-term and short-term labor contracts versus long-term and short-term debt financial contracts

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  • Tribo Gine, José Antonio

Abstract

This paper has three objectives: First to analyze the interaction between the basic internal contracts that shape the firm (labor and financial contracts). In particular we show how their temporal dimensions are related. The linkage between firm-s internal contracts and the project choice (short-term or long-term) is the second objective of our study. Finally, we check how sensitive are the type of financial intermediary (banks or markets) to the relations previously studied. These results allow us to rationalize several facts that characterize the US-UK financial system and the German-Japanese ones. As a direct implication of our theoretical model, sorne empirical tests are proposed which are particularly relevant to describe sorne features of the current Spanish economy.

Suggested Citation

  • Tribo Gine, José Antonio, 1997. "Long-term and short-term labor contracts versus long-term and short-term debt financial contracts," DEE - Working Papers. Business Economics. WB 7027, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía de la Empresa.
    • Handle: RePEc:cte:wbrepe:7027
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Tsoulouhas, Theofanis, 1996. "Labor and credit contracts with asymmetric information and bankruptcy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(8), pages 1665-1682, November.
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    3. Crawford, Vincent P, 1988. "Long-term Relationships Governed by Short-term Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(3), pages 485-499, June.
    4. Prowse, Stephen D., 1990. "Institutional investment patterns and corporate financial behavior in the United States and Japan," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 43-66, September.
    5. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1995. "Debt and Seniority: An Analysis of the Role of Hard Claims in Constraining Management," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 567-585, June.
    6. Rajan, Raghuram G, 1992. "Insiders and Outsiders: The Choice between Informed and Arm's-Length Debt," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(4), pages 1367-1400, September.
    7. Stephen D. Prowse, 1990. "Institutional investment patterns and corporate financial behavior in the U.S. and Japan," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 108, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
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