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Competition Reduces X-Inefficiency : A Note on a Limited Liability Mechanism

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  • Stennek, M.J.

    (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management)

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  • Stennek, M.J., 1995. "Competition Reduces X-Inefficiency : A Note on a Limited Liability Mechanism," Other publications TiSEM 857a7490-81ee-455b-abf1-e, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiutis:857a7490-81ee-455b-abf1-e81a9fa66544
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Innes, Robert D., 1990. "Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 45-67, October.
    2. Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, 1982. "Corporate Financial Structure and Managerial Incentives," NBER Chapters, in: The Economics of Information and Uncertainty, pages 107-140, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Jensen, Michael C, 1986. "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 323-329, May.
    4. Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716, April.
    5. Oliver D. Hart, 1983. "The Market Mechanism as an Incentive Scheme," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 366-382, Autumn.
    6. Horn, Henrik & Lang, Harald & Lundgren, Stefan, 1994. "Competition, long run contracts and internal inefficiencies in firms," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 213-233, February.
    7. Sappington, David, 1983. "Limited liability contracts between principal and agent," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 1-21, February.
    8. David Scharfstein, 1988. "Product-Market Competition and Managerial Slack," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(1), pages 147-155, Spring.
    9. Holmstrom, Bengt R. & Tirole, Jean, 1989. "The theory of the firm," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 2, pages 61-133, Elsevier.
    10. Brander, James A & Spencer, Barbara J, 1989. "Moral Hazard and Limited Liability: Implications for the Theory of the Firm," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 30(4), pages 833-849, November.
    11. Kahn, Charles & Scheinkman, Jose, 1985. "Optimal employment contracts with bankruptcy constraints," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 343-365, August.
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