A note on the equivalence of time consistency and subgame perfection in stochastic games
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- Kóczy, LászlóÁ., 2015.
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- László Á. Kóczy, 2009. "Stationary consistent equilibrium coalition structures constitute the recursive core," Working Paper Series 0905, Óbuda University, Keleti Faculty of Business and Management.
- László Á. Kóczy, 2009. "Stationary Consistent Equilibrium Coalition Structures Constitute the Recursive Core," Working Papers 2009.83, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- László Á. Kóczy, 2012. "Stationary consistent equilibrium coalition structures constitute the recursive core," Working Paper Series 1203, Óbuda University, Keleti Faculty of Business and Management.
- Koczy, Laszlo A., 2009. "Stationary Consistent Equilibrium Coalition Structures Constitute the Recursive Core," Sustainable Development Papers 54365, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
- Laszlo A. Koczy, 2012. "Stationary Consistent Equilibrium Coalition Structures Constitute the Recursive Core," CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS 1226, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
- László Á. Kóczy, 2018. "Partition Function Form Games," Theory and Decision Library C, Springer, number 978-3-319-69841-0, December.
- McNelis, Paul D. & Asilis, Carlos M., 2002. "Macroeconomic policy games and asset-price volatility in the EMS: a linear quadratic control analysis of France, Germany, Italy and Spain," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 1-24, January.
- László Á. Kóczy & Péter Biró & Balázs Sziklai, 2012. "Fair apportionment of voting districts in Hungary?," Working Paper Series 1204, Óbuda University, Keleti Faculty of Business and Management.
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