Cooperative oligopoly equilibrium
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- Zanaj Skerdilajda, 2010.
"Successive Oligopolies and Decreasing Returns,"
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-26, November.
- GABSZEWICZ, Jean J. & ZANAJ, Skerdilajda, 2006. "Competition in successive markets : entry and mergers," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2006097, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Jean Gabszewicz & Skerdilajda Zanaj, 2008. "Successive oligopolies and decreasing returns," DEM Discussion Paper Series 08-02, Department of Economics at the University of Luxembourg.
- GABSZEWICZ, Jean J. & ZANAJ, Skerdilajda, 2008. "Successive oligopolies and decreasing returns," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2008050, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Jean J., GABSZEWICZ & Skerdilajda, ZANAJ, 2008. "Successive oligopolies and decreasing returns," Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) 2008033, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques.
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