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Cooperative oligopoly equilibrium

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  • Kurz, Mordecai

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  • Kurz, Mordecai, 1985. "Cooperative oligopoly equilibrium," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 3-24, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:27:y:1985:i:1:p:3-24
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. James W. Friedman, 1971. "A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 38(1), pages 1-12.
    2. Baumol, William J, 1982. "Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of Industry Structure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(1), pages 1-15, March.
    3. Green, Edward J & Porter, Robert H, 1984. "Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 87-100, January.
    4. Novshek, William & Sonnenschein, Hugo, 1980. "Small efficient scale as a foundation for Walrasian equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 243-255, April.
    5. Hurwicz, Leonid, 1979. "On allocations attainable through Nash equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 140-165, August.
    6. Grossman, Sanford J, 1981. "Nash Equilibrium and the Industrial Organization of Markets with Large Fixed Costs," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(5), pages 1149-1172, September.
    7. CHAMPSAUR, Paul, 1976. "Symmetry and continuity properties of Lindahl equilibria," LIDAM Reprints CORE 263, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    8. Theodore C. Bergstrom, 1975. "The Core when Strategies are Restricted by Law," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 42(2), pages 249-257.
    9. Champsaur, Paul, 1976. "Symmetry and continuity properties of Lindahl equilibria," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 19-36, March.
    10. L. Hurwicz, 1979. "Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 46(2), pages 217-225.
    11. CHAMPSAUR, Paul, 1975. "How to share the cost of a public good?," LIDAM Reprints CORE 268, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    12. William Novshek, 1980. "Cournot Equilibrium with Free Entry," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 47(3), pages 473-486.
    13. Radner, Roy, 1980. "Collusive behavior in noncooperative epsilon-equilibria of oligopolies with long but finite lives," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 136-154, April.
    14. Porter, Robert H., 1983. "Optimal cartel trigger price strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 313-338, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Zanaj Skerdilajda, 2010. "Successive Oligopolies and Decreasing Returns," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-26, November.

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