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Successive oligopolies and decreasing returns

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  • GABSZEWICZ, Jean J.

    (Université catholique de Louvain (UCL). Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE))

  • ZANAJ, Skerdilajda

Abstract

In this paper, we propose an example of successive oligopolies where the downstream firms share the same decreasing returns technology of the Cobb-Douglas type. We stress the differences between the conclusions obtained under this assumption and those resulting from the traditional example considered in the literature, namely, a constant returns technology.

Suggested Citation

  • GABSZEWICZ, Jean J. & ZANAJ, Skerdilajda, 2008. "Successive oligopolies and decreasing returns," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2008050, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:2008050
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    9. GABSZEWICZ, Jean J. & ZANAJ, Skerdilajda, 2007. "A note on successive oligopolies and vertical mergers," LIDAM Reprints CORE 2009, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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    Cited by:

    1. Jean Gabszewicz & Didier Laussel & Tanguy Ypersele & Skerdilajda Zanaj, 2013. "Market Games in Successive Oligopolies," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 15(3), pages 397-410, June.
    2. SANIN, Maria Eugenia & ZANAJ, Skerdilajda, 2007. "Environmental innovation under Cournot competition," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2007050, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    3. GABSZEWICZ, Jean J. & ZANAJ, Skerdilajda, 2007. "A note on successive oligopolies and vertical mergers," LIDAM Reprints CORE 2009, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    4. Jebaraj Asirvatham & Sanjib Bhuyan, 2018. "Incentives and Impacts of Vertical Coordination in a Food Production-Marketing Chain: A Non-cooperative Multi-Stage, Multi-Player Analysis," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 59-95, March.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    successive oligopolies; vertical integration; technology.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts

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