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Equilibrium vaccination patterns in incomplete and heterogeneous networks

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  • Neilson, William
  • Xiao, Yancheng

Abstract

Under-vaccination is a usual concern of disease control studies, but this paper employs a simultaneous-move game in a three-agent contagion network to show that it is only one of the three inefficient patterns. When the network structure is incomplete or individual characteristics are heterogeneous, there exist new types of Nash equilibrium outcomes with either the right number but wrong set of people getting vaccinated or too many vaccinations, and these equilibria are robust to standard refinements. While untargeted policies can correct the standard under-vaccination problem, targeted policies are more palatable for correcting the new inefficiencies. Universal mandates can never improve on any Nash equilibria.

Suggested Citation

  • Neilson, William & Xiao, Yancheng, 2018. "Equilibrium vaccination patterns in incomplete and heterogeneous networks," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 174-192.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:105:y:2018:i:c:p:174-192
    DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2018.03.008
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Corey White, 2021. "Measuring Social and Externality Benefits of Influenza Vaccination," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 56(3), pages 749-785.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Contagion network; Vaccination; Free-riding; Targeted policy; Universal mandate;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I12 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Behavior
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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