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The effect of central bank independence on inflation in developing countries

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  • Brumm, Harold J.

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  • Brumm, Harold J., 2006. "The effect of central bank independence on inflation in developing countries," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 90(2), pages 189-193, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:90:y:2006:i:2:p:189-193
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    1. Brumm, Harold J., 2002. "Inflation and Central Bank independence revisited," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 77(2), pages 205-209, October.
    2. Cukierman, Alex & Kalaitzidakis, Pantelis & Summers, Lawrence H. & Webb, Steven B., 1993. "Central bank independence, growth, investment, and real rates," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 95-140, December.
    3. Cukierman Alex, 1992. "CENTRAL BANK STRATEGY, CREDIBILITY, AND INDEPENDANCE: THEORY AND EVIDENCE: Compte Rendu par Dominique Cariofillo," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 3(4), pages 581-590, December.
    4. Cukierman, Alex & Webb, Steven B, 1995. "Political Influence on the Central Bank: International Evidence," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 9(3), pages 397-423, September.
    5. Marta Campillo & Jeffrey A. Miron, 1997. "Why Does Inflation Differ across Countries?," NBER Chapters, in: Reducing Inflation: Motivation and Strategy, pages 335-362, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Jeffrey C. Fuhrer, 1997. "Central bank independence and inflation targeting: monetary policy paradigms for the next millenium?," New England Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, issue Jan, pages 19-36.
    7. Ismihan, Mustafa & Gulcin Ozkan, F., 2004. "Does central bank independence lower inflation?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 84(3), pages 305-309, September.
    8. Brumm, Harold J, 2000. "Inflation and Central Bank Independence: Conventional Wisdom Redux," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 32(4), pages 807-819, November.
    9. King, David & Ma, Yue, 2001. "Fiscal decentralization, central bank independence, and inflation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 95-98, July.
    10. Cukierman, Alex & Webb, Steven B & Neyapti, Bilin, 1992. "Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 6(3), pages 353-398, September.
    11. White, Halbert, 1980. "A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(4), pages 817-838, May.
    12. Alex Cukierman, 1992. "Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262031981, April.
    13. Bentler, P. M., 1983. "Simultaneous equation systems as moment structure models : With an introduction to latent variable models," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 22(1-2), pages 13-42.
    14. Aigner, Dennis J. & Hsiao, Cheng & Kapteyn, Arie & Wansbeek, Tom, 1984. "Latent variable models in econometrics," Handbook of Econometrics, in: Z. Griliches† & M. D. Intriligator (ed.), Handbook of Econometrics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 23, pages 1321-1393, Elsevier.
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