Inflation in Developing Countries: Does Central Bank Independence Matter?
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- Sturm, Jan-Egbert & Haan, Jakob de, 2001. "Inflation in developing countries: does Central Bank independence matter?," CCSO Working Papers 200101, University of Groningen, CCSO Centre for Economic Research.
References listed on IDEAS
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Keywords
Inflation; central bank independence;Statistics
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