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Sharing-group allocation problems

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  • Rhee, Sangkyu

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  • Rhee, Sangkyu, 2005. "Sharing-group allocation problems," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 51-56, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:86:y:2005:i:1:p:51-56
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Thomson,William & Lensberg,Terje, 2006. "Axiomatic Theory of Bargaining with a Variable Number of Agents," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521027038, October.
    2. Rhee, Sangkyu, 2006. "Allocation problems among sharing groups," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 398-418, February.
    3. Lerner, Anat, 1998. "A Pie Allocation Among Sharing Groups," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 316-330, February.
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    1. Rhee, Sangkyu, 2006. "Allocation problems among sharing groups," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 398-418, February.

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