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Positional Investment Theory And The Origin Of Conflicts

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  • Radim Valenčík
  • Ivan Vassilyev

Abstract

The paper deals with the possibility of applying the concept of positional investing developed in the framework of cooperative game theory to analyse the causes of non-cooperation, the growth of noncooperation into conflicts and subsequently to analyse the possibilities of conflict resolution. It is based on the theoretical assumptions of the economics of productive consumption, the supply and demand model of investment resources and investment opportunities, which it uses to describe the mechanism of positional investment. It uses the tools of positional investment analysis, in particular the function or line of neutrality of positional investment. Extends the Nash bargaining problem so that the distribution of payoffs in two-player games respects the neutrality requirement of positional investing. Based on this, it presents a concept of the causes of and possibilities for resolving difficult-to-resolve conflicts. To do so, it also uses the identification of interdependencies between certain types of games.

Suggested Citation

  • Radim Valenčík & Ivan Vassilyev, 2024. "Positional Investment Theory And The Origin Of Conflicts," Economy & Business Journal, International Scientific Publications, Bulgaria, vol. 18(1), pages 19-31.
    • Handle: RePEc:isp:journl:v:18:y:2024:i:1:p:19-31
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    References listed on IDEAS

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