IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/tiu/tiutis/0343e0fd-68d8-47b8-bc9a-6a858aa1be45.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

On the Sensitivity Matrix of the Nash Bargaining Solution

Author

Listed:
  • Engwerda, J.C.

    (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management)

  • Douven, R.C.M.H.

Abstract

In this note we provide a characterization of a subclass of bargaining problems for which the Nash solution has the property of disagreement point monotonicity.While the original d-monotonicity axiom and its stronger notion, strong d-monotonicity, were introduced and discussed by Thomson [15], this paper introduces local strong d-monotonicity and derives a necessary and sufficient condition for the Nash solution to be locally strong d-monotonic.This characterization is given by using the sensitivity matrix of the Nash bargaining solution w.r.t. the disagreement point d.Moverover, we present a sufficient condition for the Nash solution to be strong d-monotonic.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abs
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Engwerda, J.C. & Douven, R.C.M.H., 2005. "On the Sensitivity Matrix of the Nash Bargaining Solution," Other publications TiSEM 0343e0fd-68d8-47b8-bc9a-6, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiutis:0343e0fd-68d8-47b8-bc9a-6a858aa1be45
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://pure.uvt.nl/ws/portalfiles/portal/773557/35.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Thomson,William & Lensberg,Terje, 2006. "Axiomatic Theory of Bargaining with a Variable Number of Agents," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521027038, September.
    2. de Zeeuw, A J & van der Ploeg, F, 1991. "Difference Games and Policy Evaluation: A Conceptual Framework," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 43(4), pages 612-636, October.
    3. Douven, R. C. & Engwerda, J. C., 1995. "Is there room for convergence in the E.C.?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 113-130, March.
    4. Douven, R.C.M.H., 1995. "Policy coordination and convergence in the EU," Other publications TiSEM d4354b51-1c72-4109-9bde-e, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    5. Engwerda, Jacob C. & van Aarle, Bas & Plasmans, Joseph E. J., 2002. "Cooperative and non-cooperative fiscal stabilization policies in the EMU," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 451-481, March.
    6. Thomson, William, 1987. "Monotonicity of bargaining solutions with respect to the disagreement point," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 50-58, June.
    7. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    8. Petit,Maria Luisa, 2009. "Control Theory and Dynamic Games in Economic Policy Analysis," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521127158, September.
    9. Joseph Plasmans & Jacob Engwerda & Bas van Aarle & Giovanni di Bartolomeo & Tomasz Michalak, 2006. "Dynamic Modeling of Monetary and Fiscal Cooperation Among Nations," Dynamic Modeling and Econometrics in Economics and Finance, Springer, number 978-0-387-27931-2, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Michael R. Caputo, 2016. "Intrinsic Comparative Statics of a Nash Bargaining Solution," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 18(04), pages 1-11, December.
    2. Engwerda, J.C., 2005. "On the Matrix (I + X)-1," Other publications TiSEM 704d87e8-1675-4ed8-9f17-1, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Kıbrıs, Özgür & Tapkı, İpek Gürsel, 2011. "Bargaining with nonanonymous disagreement: Decomposable rules," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 62(3), pages 151-161.
    2. Youngsub Chun, 2021. "Axioms concerning uncertain disagreement points in 2-person bargaining problems," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 6(1), pages 37-58, December.
    3. Douven, R.C.M.H., 1995. "Policy coordination and convergence in the EU," Other publications TiSEM d4354b51-1c72-4109-9bde-e, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    4. Engwerda, J.C., 1998. "On the Scalar Feedback Nash Equilibria in the Infinite Horizon LQ-Game," Other publications TiSEM 3142d140-f18c-4699-be28-9, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    5. , P. & ,, 2014. "On the consistency of data with bargaining theories," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(1), January.
    6. J.C. Engwerda & B. Aarle & J.E.J. Plasmans, 1999. "The (in)finite horizon open‐loop Nash LQ game:An application to EMU," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 88(0), pages 251-273, January.
    7. Gerald Schneider & Daniel Finke & Stefanie Bailer, 2010. "Bargaining Power in the European Union: An Evaluation of Competing Game‐Theoretic Models," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 58(1), pages 85-103, February.
    8. Saglam, Ismail, 2016. "An Alternative Characterization for Iterated Kalai-Smorodinsky-Nash Compromise," MPRA Paper 73564, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Vartiainen, Hannu, 2006. "Implementing a surplus division rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 90(1), pages 108-115, January.
    10. Eric van Damme & Xu Lang, 2022. "Two-Person Bargaining when the Disagreement Point is Private Information," Papers 2211.06830, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2024.
    11. William Thomson, 2020. "Reconciling Consistency and Continuity: A Bounded-Population Characterization of the Nash Bargaining Solution," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 37(1), pages 43-57, November.
    12. Ismail Saglam, 2017. "Iterated Kalai–Smorodinsky–Nash compromise," Decisions in Economics and Finance, Springer;Associazione per la Matematica, vol. 40(1), pages 335-349, November.
    13. Shiran Rachmilevitch, 2022. "Pre-bargaining Investment Implies a Pareto Ranking of Bargaining Solutions," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 31(4), pages 769-787, August.
    14. Engwerda, J.C., 1996. "The Infinite Horizon Open-Loop Nash LQ-Game," Other publications TiSEM bb9762e7-faab-4ad2-8dd8-4, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    15. Engwerda, J.C. & Salmah, Y., 2008. "The Open-Loop Linear Quadratic Differential Game for Index One Descriptor Systems," Discussion Paper 2008-35, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    16. Kultti, Klaus & Vartiainen, Hannu, 2007. "Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets, discounting, and Nash bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 721-728, November.
    17. Marco Mariotii, 1996. "Fair bargains: distributive justice and Nash Bargaining Theory," Game Theory and Information 9611003, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 06 Dec 1996.
    18. KIbrIs, Özgür & TapkI, Ipek Gürsel, 2010. "Bargaining with nonanonymous disagreement: Monotonic rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 233-241, January.
    19. Acocella, Nicola & Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni, 2007. "Towards a new theory of economic policy: Continuity and innovation," MPRA Paper 4419, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    20. Yeh, Kuo-chun, 2012. "Renminbi in the future international monetary system," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 106-114.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
    • C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:tiu:tiutis:0343e0fd-68d8-47b8-bc9a-6a858aa1be45. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Richard Broekman (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.tilburguniversity.edu/about/schools/economics-and-management/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.