IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/ecolet/v69y2000i3p327-331.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Migration and intergroup conflict

Author

Listed:
  • Hausken, Kjell

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Hausken, Kjell, 2000. "Migration and intergroup conflict," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 69(3), pages 327-331, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:69:y:2000:i:3:p:327-331
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165-1765(00)00326-8
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Baik, Kyung Hwan & Shogren, Jason F, 1995. "Competitive-Share Group Formation in Rent-Seeking Contests," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 83(1-2), pages 113-126, April.
    2. Oliver D. Hart, 1983. "The Market Mechanism as an Incentive Scheme," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 366-382, Autumn.
    3. Nitzan, Shmuel, 1991. "Rent-Seeking with Non-identical Sharing Rules," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 71(1-2), pages 43-50, August.
    4. Skaperdas, Stergios, 1992. "Cooperation, Conflict, and Power in the Absence of Property Rights," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(4), pages 720-739, September.
    5. Lee, Sanghack, 1995. "Endogenous Sharing Rules in Collective-Group Rent-Seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 85(1-2), pages 31-44, October.
    6. Hausken, Kjell, 1998. "Collective rent seeking and division of labor1," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 739-768, November.
    7. Shmuel Nitzan, 2008. "Collective Rent Dissipation," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Arye L. Hillman & Kai A. Konrad (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1, pages 309-321, Springer.
    8. Horn, Henrik & Lang, Harald & Lundgren, Stefan, 1995. "Managerial effort incentives, X-inefficiency and international trade," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 117-138, January.
    9. Neary, Hugh M, 1997. "Equilibrium Structure in an Economic Model of Conflict," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 35(3), pages 480-494, July.
    10. Hausken, Kjell, 2000. "Cooperation and between-group competition," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 417-425, July.
    11. Durham, Yvonne & Hirshleifer, Jack & Smith, Vernon L., 2008. "The Paradox of Power," Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, in: Charles R. Plott & Vernon L. Smith (ed.), Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 16, pages 127-137, Elsevier.
    12. Kjell Hausken, 1995. "Intra-Level and Inter-Level Interaction," Rationality and Society, , vol. 7(4), pages 465-488, October.
    13. Grossman, Herschel I & Kim, Minseong, 1995. "Swords or Plowshares? A Theory of the Security of Claims to Property," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(6), pages 1275-1288, December.
    14. Hirshleifer, Jack, 1995. "Anarchy and Its Breakdown," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(1), pages 26-52, February.
    15. repec:bla:econom:v:64:y:1997:i:253:p:101-17 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Hausken, Kjell, 1995. "The dynamics of within-group and between-group interaction," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(7), pages 655-687.
    17. Vickers, John, 1995. "Concepts of Competition," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 47(1), pages 1-23, January.
    18. Sidney G. Winter, 1971. "Satisficing, Selection, and the Innovating Remnant," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 85(2), pages 237-261.
    19. D. Usher & M. Engineer, 1987. "The distribution of income in a despotic society," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 54(3), pages 261-276, August.
    20. Nitzan, Shmuel, 1994. "Modelling rent-seeking contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 41-60, May.
    21. Katz, Eliakim & Nitzan, Shmuel & Rosenberg, Jacob, 1990. "Rent-Seeking for Pure Public Goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 65(1), pages 49-60, April.
    22. Hwan Baik, Kyung & Lee, Sanghack, 1997. "Collective rent seeking with endogenous group sizes," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 121-130, February.
    23. Grossman, Herschel I, 1991. "A General Equilibrium Model of Insurrections," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(4), pages 912-921, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Hausken, Kjell & Knutsen, John F., 2010. "An enabling mechanism for the creation, adjustment, and dissolution of states and governmental units," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal (2007-2020), Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel), vol. 4, pages 1-38.
    2. Kjell Hausken, 2005. "Production and Conflict Models Versus Rent-Seeking Models," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 123(1), pages 59-93, April.
    3. Kjell Hausken, 2006. "The Stability Of Anarchy And Breakdown Of Production," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 17(6), pages 589-603.
    4. Kjell Hausken & John F. Knutsen, 2002. "The Birth, Adjustment and Death of States," Public Economics 0205004, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Kjell Hausken, 2016. "Gordon Tullock: A Nobel Prize left unbestowed," Journal of Bioeconomics, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 121-127, July.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Kjell Hausken, 2005. "Production and Conflict Models Versus Rent-Seeking Models," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 123(1), pages 59-93, April.
    2. Hausken, Kjell, 2000. "Cooperation and between-group competition," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 417-425, July.
    3. Hausken, Kjell, 1998. "Collective rent seeking and division of labor1," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 739-768, November.
    4. Noh, Suk Jae, 1999. "A General Equilibrium Model of Two Group Conflict with Endogenous Intra-group Sharing Rules," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 98(3-4), pages 251-267, March.
    5. Lee, Sanghack & Hyeong Kang, J., 1998. "Collective contests with externalities," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 727-738, November.
    6. Garfinkel, Michelle R. & Skaperdas, Stergios, 2007. "Economics of Conflict: An Overview," Handbook of Defense Economics, in: Keith Hartley & Todd Sandler (ed.), Handbook of Defense Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 22, pages 649-709, Elsevier.
    7. Kjell Hausken, 1995. "Intra-Level and Inter-Level Interaction," Rationality and Society, , vol. 7(4), pages 465-488, October.
    8. Dijkstra, Bouwe R., 1998. "Cooperation by way of support in a rent seeking contest for a public good," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 703-725, November.
    9. Rafael Reuveny & John W. Maxwell, 2001. "Conflict and Renewable Resources," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 45(6), pages 719-742, December.
    10. Baik, Kyung Hwan & Lee, Sanghack, 2007. "Collective rent seeking when sharing rules are private information," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 768-776, September.
    11. Bös, Dieter, 2002. "Contests Among Bureaucrats," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 27/2002, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
    12. Baik, Kyung Hwan & Dijkstra, Bouwe R. & Lee, Sanghack & Lee, Shi Young, 2006. "The equivalence of rent-seeking outcomes for competitive-share and strategic groups," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 337-342, June.
    13. Dieter Bös, 2002. "Contests Among Bureaucrats," CESifo Working Paper Series 807, CESifo.
    14. Hausken, Kjell, 2006. "Jack Hirshleifer: A Nobel Prize left unbestowed," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 251-276, June.
    15. Dhritiman Gupta, 2020. "Prize sharing rules in collective contests: When does group size matter?," Discussion Papers 20-04, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi.
    16. Garfinkel, Michelle R., 2004. "Global threats and the domestic struggle for power," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 495-508, June.
    17. Hoffmann, Magnus & Rota-Graziosi, Grégoire, 2012. "Endogenous timing in general rent-seeking and conflict models," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 168-184.
    18. Ke, Changxia & Konrad, Kai A. & Morath, Florian, 2013. "Brothers in arms – An experiment on the alliance puzzle," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 61-76.
    19. Hwan Baik, Kyung & Lee, Sanghack, 1997. "Collective rent seeking with endogenous group sizes," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 121-130, February.
    20. Francisco Campos-Ortiz & Louis Putterman & T.K. Ahn & Loukas Balafoutas & Mongoljin Batsaikhan & Matthias Sutter, 2012. "Security of property as a public good: Institutions, socio-political environment and experimental behavior in five countries," Working Papers 2012-26, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:69:y:2000:i:3:p:327-331. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.