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An existence result for coalition-proof equilibrium

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  • Kukushkin, Nikolai S.

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  • Kukushkin, Nikolai S., 1997. "An existence result for coalition-proof equilibrium," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 57(3), pages 269-273, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:57:y:1997:i:3:p:269-273
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Moreno, Diego & Wooders, John, 1996. "Coalition-Proof Equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 80-112, November.
    2. Ray, Indrajit, 1996. "Coalition-Proof Correlated Equilibrium: A Definition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 56-79, November.
    3. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1996. "Coalition-Proofness and Correlation with Arbitrary Communication Possibilities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 113-128, November.
    4. Bernheim, B. Douglas & Whinston, Michael D., 1987. "Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria II. Applications," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 13-29, June.
    5. Kukushkin, Nikolai S, 1992. "On Existence of Stable and Efficient Outcomes in Games with Public and Private Objectives," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 20(3), pages 295-303.
    6. Kukushkin Nikolai S., 1994. "A Condition for the Existence of a Nash Equilibrium in Games with Public and Private Objectives," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 177-192, September.
    7. Bernheim, B. Douglas & Peleg, Bezalel & Whinston, Michael D., 1987. "Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 1-12, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Hirai, Toshiyuki & Masuzawa, Takuya & Nakayama, Mikio, 2006. "Coalition-proof Nash equilibria and cores in a strategic pure exchange game of bads," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 162-170, March.
    2. Nikolai Kukushkin, 2007. "Congestion games revisited," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 36(1), pages 57-83, September.
    3. Belleflamme, Paul, 2000. "Stable Coalition Structures with Open Membership and Asymmetric Firms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 1-21, January.
    4. Federico Quartieri & Ryusuke Shinohara, 2015. "Coalition-proofness in a class of games with strategic substitutes," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(4), pages 785-813, November.

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