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Undominated coalition-proof Nash equilibria in quasi-supermodular games with monotonic externalities

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  • Shinohara, Ryusuke

Abstract

I introduce an undominated coalition-proof Nash equilibrium that is unique and is able to select undominated Nash equilibria in a quasi-supermodular game with a strict single-crossing property and monotonic externalities.

Suggested Citation

  • Shinohara, Ryusuke, 2019. "Undominated coalition-proof Nash equilibria in quasi-supermodular games with monotonic externalities," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 86-89.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:176:y:2019:i:c:p:86-89
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.01.005
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Coalition-proof Nash equilibrium; Undominated strategy; Quasi-supermodular game;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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