IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/gamebe/v17y1996i1p56-79.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Coalition-Proof Correlated Equilibrium: A Definition

Author

Listed:
  • Ray, Indrajit

Abstract

We refine the notion of correlated equilibrium capturing the essence of coalition-proof Nash equilibrium concept. We define coalition-proof correlated equilibrium of a game as a pair consisting of a correlation device and a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium of the game extended by the correlation device. A direct coalition-proof correlated equilibrium is a canonical device such that the obedient strategy is a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium of the canonical extended game. The "revelation principle" does not hold. Even in case of two-person games, there exists coalition-proof correlated equilibrium for which the corresponding induced distribution is not a direct coalition-proof correlated equilibrium. The set of direct coalition-proof correlated equilibria is not convex unlike the set of correlated equilibria. For any game, a (pure) coalition-proof Nash equilibrium is always a direct coalition-proof correlated equilibrium. We compare our notion with other existing concepts through several examples.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Ray, Indrajit, 1996. "Coalition-Proof Correlated Equilibrium: A Definition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 56-79, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:17:y:1996:i:1:p:56-79
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899-8256(96)90094-9
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Luo, Xiao, 2001. "General systems and [phiv]-stable sets -- a formal analysis of socioeconomic environments," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 95-109, November.
    2. Bloch, Francis & Dutta, Bhaskar, 2009. "Correlated equilibria, incomplete information and coalitional deviations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 721-728, July.
    3. Kukushkin, Nikolai S., 1997. "An existence result for coalition-proof equilibrium," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 57(3), pages 269-273, December.
    4. Indrajit Ray, 2002. "Multiple Equilibrium Problem and Non-Canonical Correlation Devices," Working Papers 2002-24, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    5. Ray, Indrajit, 1996. "Efficiency in correlated equilibrium," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 157-178, December.
    6. Heller, Yuval, 2010. "Minority-proof cheap-talk protocol," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 394-400, July.
    7. Giraud, Gael & Rochon, Celine, 2002. "Consistent collusion-proofness and correlation in exchange economies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(4), pages 441-463, December.
    8. Moreno, Diego & Wooders, John, 1996. "Coalition-Proof Equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 80-112, November.
    9. Gad Allon & Achal Bassamboo & Eren B. Çil, 2012. "Large-Scale Service Marketplaces: The Role of the Moderating Firm," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 58(10), pages 1854-1872, October.
    10. Heller, Yuval, 2010. "All-stage strong correlated equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 184-188, May.
    11. Grandjean, Gilles & Mantovani, Marco & Mauleon, Ana & Vannetelbosch, Vincent, 2017. "Communication structure and coalition-proofness – Experimental evidence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 90-102.
    12. Moreno, Diego & Wooders, John, 1998. "An Experimental Study of Communication and Coordination in Noncooperative Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 24(1-2), pages 47-76, July.
    13. Heller, Yuval, 2008. "Ex-ante and ex-post strong correlated equilbrium," MPRA Paper 7717, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 11 Mar 2008.
    14. Jobst Heitzig & Forest Simmons, 2012. "Some chance for consensus: voting methods for which consensus is an equilibrium," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 38(1), pages 43-57, January.
    15. Ohnishi, Kazuhiro, 2018. "Non-Altruistic Equilibria," MPRA Paper 88347, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:17:y:1996:i:1:p:56-79. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.